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JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
FACTIONS
Samuel R. Olken*
Most scholars have viewed Justice George Sutherland as a conserva-
tive jurist who opposed government regulation because of his adherence
to laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism, or because of his devo-
tion to natural rights. In this Article, Professor Olken analyzes these
widely held misperceptions of Justice Sutherland's economic liberty
jurisprudence, which was based not on socio-economic theory, but on
historical experience and common law.
Justice Sutherland, consistent with the judicial conservatism of the
Lochner era, wanted to protect individual rights from the whims of polit-
ical factions and changing democratic majorities. The Lochner era dif-
ferentiation between government regulations enacted for the public wel-
fare and those for the benefit of certain groups illuminates this underly-
ing tenet of Justice Sutherland's jurisprudence. Professor Olken also
examines Justice Sutherland's work prior to his years on the Court, his
strict construction of constitutional limitations, his view of the judiciary's
role in protecting individual rights, and his commitment to equal opera-
tion of the law. The ultimate irony in Justice Sutherland's jurisprudence
is that his strong aversion to factions and his failure to understand
Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Har-
vard College; J.D., Emory University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance and encouragement of Edward G. Hild, Professor Alberto Bernabe-
Riefkohl, and Professor J. Gordon Hylton, as well as that of Pamela Lambos, whose
infinite patience and understanding contributed significantly to the progress of this pro-
ject.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
changing industrial and social conditions, in some instances, actually
reinforced economic inequalities.
Constitutional revolutions often spawn myths in which there are
heroes and villains of exaggerated proportions. During the 1930s, a bit-
terly divided United States Supreme Court fundamentally transformed
economic substantive due process. Led by Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes, a slim majority of the Court abandoned the categorical police
powers jurisprudence of the Lochner' era in favor of a pragmatic ap-
proach that balanced public welfare and private rights in assessing the
limits of economic regulation.2 As a result, the Court sustained the types
of laws it earlier had invalidated as arbitrary and unreasonable restric-
tions upon economic liberty a A 1937 case, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
' This term refers to the rise and fall of economic substantive due process between
1870 and 1937. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was the seminal case of this
period. Stephen Siegel has suggested the Lochner era had an early phase, 1870-1900; a
middle phase, 1900-1920; and a late phase, 1920-1937. For jurists like George
Sutherland, precedent from the initial phase was especially relevant in determining the
constitutional limits of state police powers. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Juris-
prudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 & n.9
(1991) [hereinafter Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence]. Lochner era judges carefully
scrutinized economic regulations and often narrowly construed the scope of state police
powers. Unless the law substantially advanced public health, safety, morals, or welfare
(recognized categories of police powers), it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (sustain-
ing a Kansas law that prohibited the manufacture or sale of liquor as a reasonable exer-
cise of police powers).
2 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a
Washington state minimum wage regulation for women as a reasonable exercise of
police powers); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining a New York
price regulation intended to ensure adequate production and distribution of milk); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (holding that the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Law was a reasonable exercise of police powers during an eco-
nomic emergency). In all of these cases, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Asso-
ciate Justices Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Owen J. Roberts, and Harlan F.
Stone voted to sustain the economic regulations. In dissent were Associate Justices
Pierce Butler, James McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter, some-
times pejoratively referred to as the "Four Horsemen of Reaction." FRED RODELL, NINE
MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
1790 TO 1955, at 217 (1955).
' See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400 (overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), to sustain a minimum wage law for women).
[Vol. 6:1
JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Parrish,4 signified the willingness of some members of the Court to
recognize the increased importance of governmental intervention in pri-
vate economic affairs. Associate Justice George Sutherland dissented in
this pivotal case, as he had in others in which the Hughes Court flexibly
interpreted the Constitution to permit expansion of public control over
private economic interests.' Consequently, Sutherland was identified as
the guardian of a reactionary jurisprudence characterized by its obsolete
assumptions about economic liberty.6
Chronicled for years by historians sympathetic to the progressive
views of the New Deal, the constitutional revolution of 19377 has as-
sumed the status of a jurisprudential fable in which the enlightened prag-
matism of five justices displaced the anachronistic and inflexible ideas of
a quartet of dissenters intent on preserving the interests of an economic
elite.' Accordingly, legions of scholars have portrayed Sutherland as an
4 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
For example, Sutherland also wrote the dissenting opinion in Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting), and joined Justice McReynolds's dissents in
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539-59 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), and in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76-103 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that the National Labor Relations Board was unconstitutional because its enabling
act ignored the distinction between the manufacture of goods and interstate commerce).
6 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLosKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106-07, 109
(2d ed. rev. by Sanford Levinson 1994); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME
COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 52, 66-67, 73 (3rd rev. ed. 1979); RODELL, supra note
2, at 217; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 228, 233, 235
(1993); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
198-99, 254-57 (1942).
7 See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201, 204-05
(1994) (criticizing the notion of this constitutional revolution as an "historical artifact").
In 1937, the Court, in a departure from its earlier approach toward New Deal legisla-
tion, also upheld the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Social Security Act
(SSA). See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining
the NLRA); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (sustaining the SSA). Consequent-
ly, West Coast Hotel alone did not comprise the constitutional revolution of 1937, al-
though it signalled the formal repudiation of Lochnerian economic substantive due
process. For the notion that President Roosevelt's Court packing plan did not influence
the Court's decisions, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-162"(1995) (discuss-
ing the origins and politics of the Court packing plan); David P. Currie, The Constitu-
tion in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 542 &
n.170 (1987) (asserting that the Court actually decided the merits of West Coast Hotel
before Roosevelt announced his plan to appoint additional justices to the Court).
' A considerable body of literature exists in support of the popular myth that many
Lochner era jurists, influenced by principles of laissez-faire economics, Social Darwin-
ism, or natural rights, went to great lengths to interpret the Constitution to protect prop-
erty rights. See generally, e.g., CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS:
1997]
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ardent foe of government regulation who, like conservative jurists before
him, imbued his analysis of the Constitution with principles of laissez-
faire economics and Social Darwinism.9 This was the conclusion of
Sutherland's only true biographer, Joel Paschal, who contended that
Sutherland's solicitude for private rights emanated from his fervent belief
that government should not interfere with natural economic forces or the
evolutionary progress of individuals."' In large part, this perception per-
sists, although some view Sutherland as a jurist whose devotion to natu-
ral rights, rather than economic theory, influenced his behavior on the
Court.11 Both views, however, oversimplify Sutherland's economic lib-
THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F.
DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954) (arguing that Lochner era
jurists used laissez-faire economics to advance the property interests of an economic
elite); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (reprint ed. 1976) (discussing the increase in conserva-
tism and laissez-faire constitutionalism); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CON-
STITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1962) (noting the in-
fluence of laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism on judicial review of local
economic regulations); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Political Economy]
(noting the pervasive influence of classical economic theory during the Lochner era
while disputing the notion that the judges were Social Darwinists); Paul Kens, The
Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire Constitutionalism,
1900-1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70 (1991) (discussing the influence of laissez-faire
economics and Social Darwinism); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Conservative World of
Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883-1910, 32 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 443 (1938) [hereinafter
Mason, Conservative World] (sketching the background of the initial and middle phases
of the Lochner era); Frank R. Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emer-
gence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973) (attributing the era's
jurisprudence to laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism).
For specific discussion of the conservative nature of police powers jurisprudence
during the 1920s and 1930s as reflective of laissez-faire economics, Social Darwinism,
and/or natural law, see, for example, MASON, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at
66-67, 70, 73; SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 234-35; WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 200-60;
Ronald F. Howell, The Judicial Conservatives Three Decades Ago: Aristocratic Guard-
ians of the Prerogatives of Property and the Judiciary, 49 VA. L. REV. 1447 passim
(1963); see also GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 181-93 (1977) (discussing the pragmatism of Chief Justice Hughes's
opinion in Blaisdell).
9 See, e.g., J. Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland, in MR. JUSTICE 123, 126-28
(Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956) (ascribing to Sutherland an affinity
for laissez-faire (classical) economics) [hereinafter Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland];
Howell, supra note 8, at 1453, 1456, 1467-75; Kens, supra note 8, at 96-98; Strong,
supra note 8, at 452.
10 See JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE
STATE (1951) [hereinafter PASCHAL, SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE].
" See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
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erty jurisprudence and obscure its historical context. Undoubtedly,
Sutherland was part of a conservative judicial tradition, yet misunder-
standing about this tradition has created a skewed and inaccurate apprais-
al of Sutherland's work on the Supreme Court.
Recent historiography suggests that nineteenth and early twentieth
century judges relied relatively little upon laissez-faire economics,12
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS passim (1994). Arkes contends that Sutherland's
jurisprudence was, in essence, a jurisprudence of natural rights in which unchanging
moral, rather than economic, principles prescribed the limits of governmental authority.
Unfortunately, Arkes overstates the influence of natural law/rights as a constitutional
norm. He confuses the occasional natural rights rhetoric with the actual substance of
Lochner era police powers jurisprudence. While many jurists may have held some per-
sonal beliefs in natural law, most declined to use it as the principal basis of decision
making after the Civil War. See Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at
63-66 (contending that Lochner era jurists invoked historical consciousness and the
common law rather than natural rights); see also Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late
Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 1431 passim [hereinafter
Siegel, Historism] (examining the historist jurisprudence of John Pomeroy, Thomas
Cooley, and Christopher Tiedeman). Siegel defines historism as a form of "historical
consciousness." Id. at 1437 n.18. Because Sutherland sought to preserve the methodolo-
gy of Lochner era police powers jurisprudence, it is unlikely that he relied very much
upon natural law/rights. For further discussion of the decline of natural law/rights in late
nineteenth century constitutional thought, see William E. Nelson, The Impact of the
Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century Ameri-
ca, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 558-60 (1974) (suggesting that natural law's emphasis upon
static moral principles and its relative rigidity rendered it largely unsuitable for address-
ing many legal issues in a rapidly changing industrial society).
12 As used in this Article, laissez-faire economics refers to a theory of political
economy in which the role of government in market relations assumes minimal impor-
tance in the private allocation of resources and the creation of economic opportunity.
The value of goods and services derives from the natural law of supply and demand,
which regulates the market free from the artificial constraint of public control and al-
lows for maximum efficiency as individuals act pursuant to their own economic needs
and desires. See TWISS, supra note 8, at 65. Drawing upon the classical economic theo-
ry set forth in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, nineteenth century political philos-
ophers Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner articulated the most extreme
versions of laissez-faire economics. See, e.g., HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS
THE STATE passim (London, Williams & Norgale 1884); WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER,
ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER I & II (Albert Keller,& Maurice R. Davie eds.,
1934) [hereinafter SUMNER, ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER I & II]; WILLIAM
GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT THE SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER passim (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1883) [hereinafter SUMNER, WHAT THE SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO
EACH OTHER].
For criticism of the conventional assumption that Lochner era jurists relied exten-
sively upon laissez-faire economics, see generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITU-
TION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRU-
DENCE (1993) (noting that factional aversion and not economic theory best explains the
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Social Darwinism," or natural rights.'4 Instead, they invoked the limits
of the Constitution to protect private rights from the ephemeral whims of
turbulent democratic majorities controlled by political factions. Foremost
among the civil rights that these jurists sought to protect was the right to
pattern of judicial decisions); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-
Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW &
HIST. REV. 293 (1985) (distinguishing between laissez-faire constitutionalism reflective
of longstanding ideals of liberty and equal opportunity and that based upon classical
economic theory). Like Gillman, Benedict contends Lochner era police powers jurispru-
dence emanated from an aversion toward political factions, and he refutes the idea that
laissez-faire economics significantly influenced the pattern of judicial decision making.
Id. at 311-14. Alan Jones's seminal study of Thomas Cooley, the pre-eminent constitu-
tional theorist of the early Lochner era, also refutes the traditional notion that laissez-
faire economic theory dominated late nineteenth century judicial thought. See Alan
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration,
53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752 (1967).
13 As used in this Article, Social Darwinism refers to a sociological theory that com-
plemented the evolutionary concepts of naturalist Charles Darwin. Its foremost propo-
nents, Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, believed that the finite amount of
natural resources necessitated intense competition among individuals for long-term sur-
vival. Those most likely to survive developed superior adaptive attributes that rendered
them most fit to handle changes within their environment. Like laissez-faire economics,
Social Darwinism prescribed a marginal role for government; it presumed that the cruci-
ble of sometimes ruthless competition was necessary for the eventual perfection of soci-
ety. See generally, e.g., SPENCER, supra note 12; SUMNER, ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRA-
HAM SUMNER I & II, supra note 12; SUMNER, WHAT THE SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO
EACH OTHER, supra note 12. Even those who associate laissez-faire economics with the
Lochner era question the influence of Social Darwinism. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Politi-
cal Economy, supra note 8, at 418-20; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1451, 1461
n.153, 1480.
S"4 As used in this Article, natural rights and natural law are synonymous terms. Both
terms refer to immutable moral principles that, in theory, people can ascertain through
direct intuition. See Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1434 n.5, 1434-35. Natural law
embodies these principles and creates corresponding rights and duties for members of
society. See JAMES HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY 10
(1990). "Natural rights ... are not something different from natural law but refer to the
entitlement aspect of the relationship created by a natural law." Id. Herget further notes
"that the idea of natural law makes sense as an abstract generality, but any attempt to
apply it to specific legal and ethical issues is impossible. Hence, the idea is useless as a
practical matter." Id. at 11. For historical discussion of the marginal influence of natural
law/rights on Lochner era jurists, see Nelson, supra note 11, at 513, 558-60 (attributing
the decline of natural law in constitutional discourse to its inherent ambiguity and em-
phasis upon static moral principles inappropriate for resolving industrial legal issues);
Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-90,
96 (stating that historical custom and the common law displaced natural law as a late
nineteenth century constitutional norm); see also Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at
1435-37.
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property, which they perceived as representative of other individual
liberties and as especially vulnerable in a democratic republic. 5
Lochner era judges distinguished impartial laws that inured to the benefit
of the entire community from impermissible partial laws, or class legisla-
tion, that appeared to benefit some groups at the expense of others.16
These judges actually upheld most economic regulation as long as it bore
a substantial relationship to the public welfare. 7 Thomas Cooley and
Stephen Field, both instrumental in the rise of economic substantive due
process, emphasized equal operation of the law as the touchstone of
economic liberty necessary for individuals to flourish in a thriving de-
mocracy. Their historical and common law analysis of state police pow-
ers reflected longstanding anti-factional bias and implicitly rejected the
use of socio-economic theory as a constitutional norm." They also ex-
erted enormous influence over members of the judiciary and the bar for
more than half a century. This influence was particularly strong with
respect to George Sutherland, who studied law under Cooley and applied
much of Field's constitutional analysis throughout his own tenure on the
Supreme Court.
'5 See Jones, supra note 12, at 766 (discussing Thomas Cooley). This was also true
of the Framers of the Constitution. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND
ITS LEGACY 1, 6, 24-25, 153, 204, 206-08, 228 (1990) (discussing the constitutional
philosophy of James Madison and its pervasive influence on judicial review throughout
the next century and a half).
16 See generally GILLMAN, supra note 12; see also Benedict, supra note 12, at 298,
328-30.
" See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court,
40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944-45 & n.11 (1927). Brown notes that between 1868 and
1920 the United States Supreme Court invalidated only 13 out of 145 (8.9%) state and
federal laws on economic substantive due process grounds. Between 1921 and 1927 the
Court struck down 15 out of 53 (28%) laws on this basis. See id.; see also Melvin I.
Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A Reeval-
uation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 passim (1985); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The
Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B. SUp. CT.
HIST. Soc'Y 53 passim.
"8 For discussion of Thomas Cooley, see, for example, Jones, supra note 12, at 752,
755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1488-1515 (dis-
cussing both Cooley's private and public law jurisprudence). For discussion of Stephen
Field, see generally Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Gov-
ernment-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-
1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, at 1003-05 (1975), reprinted in AMERICAN LAW & THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 246, 264-65 (Lawrence M. Fried-
man & Harry N. Scheiber eds., enlarged ed. 1988); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence,
supra note 1, at 90-99.
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A revised understanding of the Lochner era, therefore, compels reap-
praisal of Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence. Sutherland de-
rived much of its content from the past and closely identified with the
conservative judicial tradition that evolved from the early days of the na-
tion. From this perspective, Sutherland emerges as an especially cautious
jurist, whose opposition to some forms of government regulation emanat-
ed from his aversion to political factions. Inherently skeptical of legisla-
tive panaceas for social and economic problems, Sutherland, like conser-
vative jurists before him, used historical experience and the common
law, rather than socio-economic theory, to guide his constitutional inter-
pretation.19 Moreover, the description of Sutherland as a doctrinaire ad-
herent of laissez-faire economics or Social Darwinism ignores the nuanc-
es of his jurisprudence and its consistency with his legislative support of
workmen's compensation, women's suffrage, and other reform measures
that he thought promoted the public welfare.
Sutherland's passionate, yet flawed, defense of the judicial preroga-
tive to declare constitutional limitations during the final phase of the
Lochner era drew upon a classical notion of the Supreme Court as "the
least dangerous branch" in a democracy.2' In some respects, Sutherland
was a transitional figure on the Court. His concern about the tyranny
posed by irresponsible majorities and his emphasis upon equal operation
of the law anticipated the modern Court's willingness to invoke strict
scrutiny in the equal protection context.21 His adherence to an anachro-
nistic view of state police powers during the Depression may have been
myopic and seemingly insensitive, if not naive. Nevertheless, scholars
have erred in construing Justice Sutherland's economic liberty jurispru-
dence from the sole vantage point of those who triumphed in the consti-
tutional crisis of the 1930s. Theirs is an inaccurate portrait of a jurist
On conservative jurists before Sutherland who used historical custom and com-
mon law principles in constitutional interpretation, see Jones, supra note 12, at 752,
755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71; see also Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra
note 1, at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-99; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11.
2 The Least Dangerous Branch is the title of a 1962 book written by the late Alex-
ander Bickel about federal judicial review. Alexander Hamilton initially explained that
the Supreme Court was "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them." THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 520 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press ed. 1945). Distinct from the legisla-
tive and the executive branches, it wields neither the purse nor the sword. It merely
exercises the power of judgment in a constitutional democracy. See id.
2 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493, 511 (1989) (O'Connor,
J.) (discussing political factions and the importance of strict judicial scrutiny of race-
conscious remedies); see also Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 100-
09 (referring to the Lochner era as a transitional era in American constitutional history).
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infinitely more complex and progressive than one might otherwise ex-
pect.
This Article has three parts. Part I provides an overview of the con-
servative judicial tradition based upon recent historical analysis of the
Lochner era and its antecedents. It demonstrates the pervasive bias
against factions that influenced the development of judicial review and
explains the minimal influence of laissez-faire economics, Social Dar-
winism, and natural rights as constitutional norms. Part II discusses
Sutherland's notions of law and democracy and reveals his distaste for
partial laws. Part III examines the extent to which factional aversion,
historical custom, and the common law suffused Sutherland's economic
liberty jurisprudence.2 It analyzes some of the inherent flaws and iro-
nies of this jurisprudence and suggests that Sutherland's adherence to a
conservative judicial tradition may have rendered him unable to under-
stand the socio-economic ramifications of some of his more unfortunate
decisions.
I. THE CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL TRADITION: FACTIONS, COMMON LAW,
AND HISTORICAL CUSTOM, 1787-1921
As a member of the United States Supreme Court, Justice George
Sutherland reflected a conservative judicial tradition in which judges in-
voked constitutional limitations to restrain political factions and preserve
individual economic liberty. Through their reserved powers to promote
public health, safety, morals, and welfare, states, from the inception of
the republic, had enacted laws that sometimes restricted personal proper-
ty and contract rights. Ostensibly distinguishing between law and poli-
tics, judges required a substantial relationship between economic regula-
tions and the public welfare in order to protect private rights from the
sometimes capricious tendencies of fleeting democratic majorities. By
1905, when the Supreme Court issued its controversial decision in
Lochner v. New York,' several generations of jurists had adhered to a
narrow conception of state police powers and a cogent belief in the pri-
macy of constitutional limitations.
After 1937 and the fundamental transformation of economic substan-
tive due process, scholars often explained the development of Lochner
era police powers jurisprudence from a limited historical perspective.
Rarely did they consider that for many late nineteenth and early twenti-
' This Article focuses on only those aspects of Sutherland's economic liberty juris-
prudence that involve substantive due process and the Contract Clause. Analysis of
Sutherland's views about the Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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eth century jurists the questions of public control over private economic
affairs involved concepts of limited democracy and political legitimacy
formed years before the Gilded Age. Accordingly, Lochner and other
cases were thought to represent a reactionary activism in which judges
invoked principles of laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism to
protect the property interests of an economic elite.'
Recently, however, some historians have challenged these relatively
narrow assumptions about judicial behavior. Instead they have looked be-
yond the post-Civil War period to Jacksonian democracy and even earlier
for principled explanations as to why courts occasionally invalidated
state economic and labor reform laws between 1870 and 1937. Michael
Les Benedict and Howard Gillman, among others, have attributed the
marked judicial conservatism of the Lochner era to longstanding con-
cerns about political factions and the vulnerability of individual rights in
a democratic republic.'
From this perspective, a pattern of judicial review emerges in which
judges differentiated between laws enacted for the public welfare and
those for the benefit of particular groups. To the extent that members of
the judiciary questioned the propriety of industrial regulations, they did
so based on an unwavering commitment to equal operation of the law
and a skepticism of political expediency. Judges ultimately assessed the
constitutional limits of state police powers through common law and
historical custom rather than through an appeal to their own particular
economic and social views.' Examination of the contours of this judi-
2 In large part, this perspective emanates from Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner,
in which he accused the majority of deciding the case "upon an economic theory which
a large part of the country does not entertain." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Holmes then implied that the Court based its ruling upon laissez-faire economics and
Social Darwinism when he wrote: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). He also explained that "a
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory ... ." Id. (Holmes,
J., dissenting). See generally JACOBS, supra note 8; TWiSS, supra note 8; Kens, supra
note 8; Mason, Conservative World, supra note 8; Strong, supra note 8.
25 See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 12, passim; NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 1, 6, 23-
25, 32, 38, 44, 64, 153, 161-62, 172, 177-79, 203-04, 206-08, 211 (discussing the views
of constitutional Framers, particularly those of James Madison); Benedict, supra note
12, passim.
26 See Jones, supra note 12, at 752, 755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71; see also Siegel,
Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-99. See gen-
erally Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidere& Major
Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 20
(discussing the common law methodology of Lochner era jurists); Siegel, Historism,
supra note 11 (discussing historism).
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cial tradition provides an essential context from which to understand the
economic liberty jurisprudence of George Sutherland.
A. The Anti-Factional Origins of the Constitution
From the outset, the constitutional Framers recognized the problem of
political factions in a democratic republic. After the conclusion of the
Revolutionary War, they witnessed popular majorities, comprised largely
of factions of debtors and those without much property, exert tremendous
control over state legislatures.27 Throughout the 1780s, enormous debt
from the war restricted the amount of available capital, making it diffi-
cult for many citizens to fulfill their debt obligations. In response to the
popular clamor for relief, states enacted various measures that altered
private credit agreements and impaired the contract and property rights
of creditors for the benefit of debtors. Rather than alleviate the harsh
economic conditions, many of these debtor relief laws actually imperilled
the public welfare and signified the vulnerability of property rights in a
virtually unlimited democracy.'
By 1787, it became apparent that the loose federation of states creat-
ed by the Articles of Confederation was unable to preserve individual
liberty and to restrain the turbulent whims of democratic majorities.
Artisans, merchants, and creditors for whom property represented an
inalienable right and a means of stability sought to strengthen the nation-
al government and limit the influence of local factions.29 Representa-
tives from the states convened that summer in Philadelphia and replaced
the Articles of Confederation with our present constitutional system.
Insofar as the Framers proclaimed the virtue of property and its para-
mount importance in a democratic republic, they implicitly understood its
tendency to promote factions. James Madison, the principal architect of
the Constitution, attributed the emergence of factions to both personal
liberty, which enabled all to pursue property, and the differences in
individuals' ability to acquire property.' Madison thought factions were
27 See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 20, 28-31; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55
(James Madison) (The Heritage Press ed. 1945); NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 2, 4, 30;
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 402-03,
409-13 (Norton 1972).
2 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 28; BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CON-
TRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-6 (1938); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Con-
cern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early American
Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1139-43.
29 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 22, 29; Benedict, supra note 12, at 317.
30 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 56. Madison ob-
served: "From the protection of different and unequal- faculties of acquiring property,
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inevitable, as liberty made possible the unequal distribution of proper-
ty,3 creating societal divisions between groups of citizens "whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole ... united and actu-
ated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."32
The Framers' experience with a plethora of post-Revolutionary
redistributive legislation confirmed their inherent skepticism about major-
ity rule. They believed that those with little or no property were more
likely to use the democratic process in ways harmful to members of the
minority who had relatively large amounts of property.33 Thus, Madison
noted tha,"[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the form of popu-
lar government ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passions or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens. '
the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from
the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues
a division of the society into different interests and parties." Id.
3' See id. at 56-57.
32 Id. at 55. Madison opposed class, or partial, legislation, which he believed threat-
ened the public welfare. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 385 (James Madison) (The
Heritage Press ed. 1945) (explaining that Congress was unlikely to pass partial laws);
see also NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 30-31, 42-45. Madison was concerned with
"secur[ing] the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and
at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 58.
3 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 27 (1991); NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 3-7, 17-25, 32, 153, 161,
208, 211. Madison reasoned that a majority comprised of those without much property
might, in its zeal to protect other personal rights, threaten the property rights of a prop-
ertied minority. He thought that because persons of property had both property and
personal rights at stake, they would be less tyrannical toward other members of the
polity. See id. at 18. Madison, as well as other constitutional Framers, perceived the
right to property as representative of other civil rights and as especially vulnerable in a
democratic republic. See id. at 1, 6-7, 18, 23-25, 32, 153, 204, 206. Insofar as the
Framers recognized an implicit tension between property and other personal rights, they
believed that protection of the former from arbitrary government was integral to the
security of other personal rights and, thus, essential to the stability of society. See id. at
17-25, 32, 38, 41, 44, 272. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
34 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 58. Madison realized
that "the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the
means of controlling its effects." Id. Neither pure democracy nor equal political rights
would attain this objective. See id. at 59. In a large republic, however, a plethora of
factions would keep each other in check and prevent the inordinant influence of any
particular interest group. See id. at 61.
[Vol. 6:1
JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
This conception of public welfare drew upon the commonwealth
ideals of earlier generations of English reformers for whom class, or
partial, legislation undermined the legitimacy of governmental authori-
ty. 35 Seventeenth century English courts had invalidated as unlawful
restraints of trade grants of exclusive monopolies from the British mon-
arch to favored groups or individuals.' Whig political reformers later
proclaimed that government intervention on behalf of some citizens, but
not others, threatened the overall public good. 37 By the 1780s, Madison
and other American political thinkers concluded that the protection of
individual liberty and the security of property rights were integral to "the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."38 Impartial gov-
ernment, therefore, limited the opportunities for political factions to enact
special interest laws inimical to the public welfare.39
Although seemingly committed to the concept of market liberty and
the free exchange of property, the Framers of the Constitution primarily
were interested in the security of property rights, which they deemed
essential to the enjoyment of other civil rights and liberties.4" Theirs
was not so much an economic theory of government as an attempt to
restrict factions while preserving personal freedom.41 The Constitution
they created, with its careful distribution and limitation of governmental
powers, largely sought to protect individual rights from the tyranny of
popular majorities that were controlled by factions eager to promote their
own interests at the expense of the public good.42
35 See WOOD, supra note 27, at 54-55; Benedict, supra note 12, at 314-17.
31 See, e.g., Ipswich Tailors' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (1614) (invalidating a tailors'
monopoly as an unlawful restraint of trade detrimental to the commonwealth); The Case
of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602) (invalidating a card monopoly).
37 See WOOD, supra note 27, at 53-65 (discussing eighteenth century commonwealth
ideals); Benedict, supra note 12, at 316-17.
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 55; see also
NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 1, 23-27, 32, 38, 41-45, 177-80, 203-08.
39 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 20, at 525 (dis-
cussing unjust partial laws); NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 43-45; WOOD, supra note 27,
at 54-55; Benedict, supra note 12, at 317.
40 See NEDELSKY, supra note:15, at 1, 23-27, 32, 38, 41-45, 177-80, 203-08; BER-
NARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 171 (1980).
41 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (explaining how separation of
powers limits governmental authority, curbs factions, and preserves individual rights);
NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 44-45, 177-80, 207; SIEGAN, supra note 40, at 272-73.
Siegan explains that majoritarianism poses several problems for the protection of indi-
vidual rights. First, "[m]ajorities do not necessarily have enough knowledge, insight or
expertise to assure wisest action." Id. at 273. Second, "the laws that fleeting alliances
produce may long outlast the forces that created them." Id.
42 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 13, 30-31.
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B. Vested Rights, Judicial Review, and the Distinction Between Law and
Politics
Alexander Hamilton most clearly perceived the connection between
judicial review and factional bias. He believed that independent judges,
free from the influence of political factions, would be the "bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachment." '43 Through an
impartial review of governmental action, judges would maintain the
supremacy of constitutional principles intended to curb factions by inval-
idating "unjust and partial laws" that hurt the "private rights of particular
classes of citizens." 44
During the early years of the nation, judges distinguished between
law and politics by asserting that principles of law protected property
and contract rights from the expediency of political factions and the
turbulence of democratic majorities. 5 Pursuant to this reasoning, many
jurists applied the concept of vested rights as a limitation upon state
legislative power. Under this concept, rights vested in those to whom the
government granted land or gave a charter. With few exceptions, subse-
quent legislation that repealed the original grant or charter unlawfully
divested the recipients of their property and contract rights. 4 Through-
out the colonial and post-Revolutionary periods, governments encouraged
economic development and commercial enterprise through grants and
charters.47 Laws enacted in response to the fleeting emotions of popular
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 20, at 524.
" Id. at 525.
" See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that legislative
repeal of a prior land grant violates the Contract Clause); Huidekoper's Lessee v.
Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805) (holding that a state's obscure interpretation of
the language in the legislature's land grant should not be upheld); see also NEDELSKY,
supra note 15, at 8, 187-99; Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 52-61.
46 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829) (sustaining a Rhode
Island law that transferred realty in satisfaction of a debt, but recognizing the doctrine
of vested rights as a limit upon legislative power); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (invalidating New Hampshire laws that revoked a college's
corporate charter); Van Home v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No.
16,857) (holding that Pennsylvania could not divest its citizens of real property, even
with compensation, in favor of Connecticut claimants to resolve an interstate land dis-
pute). See generally, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 595-673 (abridged ed. 1991) (discussing the Marshall Court and
vested rights); Benedict, supra note 12, at 323-25; Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence,
supra note 1, at 52-61.
41 See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 88-100
(1989); Benedict, supra note 12, at 317.
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majorities that threatened to divest rights acquired through grants or
charters were often regarded as detrimental to the public welfare. '
Initially, the Marshall Court used vested rights theory to support its
expansive interpretation of the Contract Clause. In Fletcher v. Peck,49
the Court invalidated Georgia's 1796 repeal of the previous year's legis-
lation through which innocent third party purchasers claimed title to
millions of acres of land in the Yazoo territory." In his majority opin-
ion, Chief Justice John Marshall asserted that under common law a grant
was a contract in which the grantor implicitly promised not to revoke or
reassert its rights to the property. 1 Although he was aware that Georgia
revoked its original grant to speculators who bribed a corrupt legislature,
Marshall insisted that the state's actions divested innocent third parties,
who purchased the land from the speculators, of their contract rights.52
Concerned primarily with the security of property rights and the sanctity
of contracts, he said that the Contract Clause served "to shield ... prop-
erty from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men
are exposed., 53
Using this reasoning, the Court also held unconstitutional New
Hampshire laws that revoked Dartmouth College's charter, made the
private, eleemosynary educational institution a state university, and di-
vested the original college corporation of its property, which came under
the control of a new public entity. 4 Upset with Dartmouth's educational
objectives, political and religious factions within the state convinced the
New Hampshire legislature to enact these laws.5 In ruling that the state
impaired the college's charter, the Court applied the Contract Clause to
protect the private rights of a corporation from partial, or class, legisla-
tion that redistributed property. 6 Similarly, the Marshall Court invali-
a See, e.g., Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 557-58, 569, 573, 577-80
(argument of Daniel Webster, counsel for Plaintiffs in Error). Webster argued that New
Hampshire laws that changed a private eleemosynary educational corporation into a
public university divested the college's proprietors of private property acquired through
an eighteenth century royal charter. See id.
49 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
50 In 1795, speculators bribed the Georgia legislature into conveying over thirty
million acres of land. A year later, a newly elected legislature enacted a law 'revoking
this land grant. Unaware of the repeal, Fletcher bought fifteen thousand acres from
Peck, who acquired his interest in the land from Gunn, an original grantee. See id. at
87-92.
SI See id. at 136-37.
52 See id. at 135, 139.
13 Id. at 138.
5 See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
5 See WHITE, supra note 46, at 613.
5 See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 653-54.
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dated a debtor relief law that excused payment of an antecedent debt,
and struck down other retroactive measures that altered contract obliga-
tions in ways that demonstrated the particular vulnerability of private
rights in a democratic republic. 7
Although the early Court occasionally referred to natural law limits
on state legislative power, it relied mostly on the common law principle
of vested rights. 8 Some justices explicitly rejected natural law as the
basis for restraining legislative power because of its vague and imprecise
standards. 9 Others reasoned that the government alone created vested
rights and thus could not revoke or impair property interests conferred in
charters without reserving those powers in the initial grant of property
rights to private parties.' As the Court increasingly derived meaning
and content for the Contract Clause from the common law, it anticipated
the historist methods of late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists
like Thomas Cooley and George Sutherland, who used common law
See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (invalidating a
retroactive New York insolvency law that discharged a debtor from an antecedent con-
tractual obligation); see also Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (invalidating
the Kentucky Occupying Claimants Law under the Contract Clause). But see Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (sustaining a prospective New York insol-
vency law). In Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall dissented, contending that both
retroactive and prospective insolvency laws impair the obligation of contracts. See id. at
332-37 (Marshall, C. J., dissenting). In support of his argument, Marshall invoked the
spectre of post-Revolutionary debtor relief laws and political factions. See id. at 354-57
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
" See NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 8, 195 (contending that the Marshall Court used
common law to define property rights and to prescribe the constitutional limits of legis-
lative authority); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 30-51 (asserting
that the Marshall Court used vested rights theory to reconcile natural law with textual
constitutional interpretation-"constitutional conceptualism").
51 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (holding that a Connecticut
law that set aside a probate decree was not an ex post facto law). In Calder, Justice
Samuel Chase invoked natural law when he said: "An ACT of the Legislature ...
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a right-
ful exercise of legislative authority." Id. at 388 (Chase, J.). In contrast, Justice James
Iredell criticized natural law as the basis of constitutional adjudication:
If... the Legislature ... shall pass a law, within the general scope of [its] con-
stitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is,
in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and the purest men have
differed upon the subject ....
Id. at 399 (Iredell, J.).
o See WHITE, supra note 46, at 619-20 (suggesting that Justice Joseph Story implic-
itly rejected natural law as the source of vested property rights and as a limitation upon
legislative power to divest private rights conferred by prior grants and charters); see
also Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 708-12 (Story, J., concurring).
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principles, rather than abstract theories of natural rights, to protect pri-
vate rights from the class legislation of political factions.
C. Jacksonian Democracy: Equality, Class Legislation, and the Public
Welfare
By the end of the 1820s, deep divisions existed within American
society. Improvements in technology, favorable governmental economic
policies, and the growth of urban areas contributed significantly to indus-
trial development. Large-scale production of goods increased the unequal
distribution of property. Many more people toiled as laborers for modest
wages than profited from the ownership of factories and other business-
es. As economic independence became more difficult for many to attain,
concerns arose that the protection of vested property rights often con-
ferred a privileged status on an economic elite and that this status was
detrimental to the long-term interests of the public welfare."
Jacksonian democracy emerged from an alliance of laborers, farmers,
small merchants, and other socio-economic groups eager to reprise Jef-
fersonian ideals of economic liberty and political equality.62 Jefferson,
an ardent foe of unrestricted government, decried against its partisan
intervention in the market economy of the early nineteenth century. He
believed that equal opportunity and personal liberty encouraged the self-
reliance essential to a thriving democracy.63 Jeffersonian Republicans
opposed Federalist policies that created economic privileges for favored
citizens and excluded others from similar opportunities.'
Jacksonian Democrats followed in this anti-factional tradition. They
regarded laws that vested corporations, monopolies, tax exemptions, and
other privileges in but a few persons as harmful to the community. This
partial legislation was illegitimate because it created artificial distinctions
often in conflict with the interests of the public. Instead, Jacksonian
Democrats thought that government should promote widespread partici-
pation in the market.65 Jacksonians did not, however, necessarily seek to
61 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 39-40, 43.
62 See id. at 34-35; Benedict, supra note 12, at 318. See generally ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 306-21, 334-46 (1945) (describing Jacksonian
democracy).
63 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 26; Benedict, supra note 12, at 317-18.
See Benedict, supra note 12, at 317-18. Jefferson himself did not oppose charters
for the benefit of the entire community. In general, he supported the principle prevalent
in the early republic that government should encourage economic and industrial devel-
opment in a neutral manner. Id. at 318.
61 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 36-37; SCHLESINGER, supra note 62, at 306-49
(discussing Jacksonian political economy); Benedict, supra note 12, at 317-22; Stephen
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redistribute wealth. Rather, they sought to preserve economic liberty
through the impartial restraint of laws intended to encourage equal op-
portunity.66
Jacksonian judges interpreted "law of the land" provisions in state
constitutions as limits on government's power to enact partial, or class,
legislation. 7 They viewed the clause, "law of the land," as a mandate
for government to remain neutral. Laws of general application that were
"equally binding upon every member of the community" were consonant
with the public good.68 Eager to protect the rights of the minority from
the tyranny of popular majorities, Jacksonian jurists distinguished be-
tween laws for the benefit of particular individuals or groups and those
for the public welfare.6
A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 29-40, 55, 59, 64-66, 70-75 (1986) (describing the dichotomy between econom-
ic privilege and property rights). President Andrew Jackson was especially critical of
partial, or class, legislation. In his veto of the bill renewing the charter of the second
United States Bank, he described himself a foe of "exclusive privileges ... [and]
against any prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at the ex-
pense of the many . . . ." ANDREW JACKSON, VETO MESSAGE (July 10, 1832), reprinted
in IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE AGE OF JACKSON 199 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 1964)
(criticizing the bank's monopolistic status and discussing the virtues of neutral govern-
ment); see also William M. Gouge, The Artificial Inequality of Wealth (1835), in IDE-
OLOGY AND POWER IN THE AGE OF JACKSON, supra, at 110-21 (Jacksonian essayist
assailing economic privilege and exalting equal economic opportunity).
See Benedict, supra note 12, at 318-19.
'7 Inserted in several state constitutions during the first quarter of the nineteenth
century, the term "law of the land" referred to "a general and public law, equally bind-
ing upon every member of the community." Vanzant v. Waddel, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259,
270 (1829) (sustaining a law that gave bank creditors additional collection remedies).
Vanzant, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 270. Conversely, a partial law was one "tending
directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual of rights to property, or
to the equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land . . . ." Id. at 269.
69 See, e.g., Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555-57 (1831) (invali-
dating as unconstitutional partial legislation a Tennessee law that dismissed suits filed
on behalf of Cherokee Indians to recover land reserved to the tribe pursuant to federal
treaties). The court distinguished between laws of equal operation and partial ones, see
id. at 555-56, and said the state constitution required general public laws "to secure to
weak and unpopular minorities and individuals equal rights with the majority, who ...
exercise the legislative power." Id. at 557. Otherwise, "the majority in the govern-
ment ... [would be] a many-headed tyrant, with capacity and power to oppress the
minority at pleasure, by odious laws binding on the latter." Id.; see also Bank v. Coo-
per, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606-09 (1831) (invalidating legislative creation of a special
tribunal to hear all suits brought by the state bank against its debtors and discussing the
"selfish passions" of legislative majorities).
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Rather than invoke vested rights to restrain political factions, as Federal-
ist judges had done, judges of this era used the concept of public welfare
to limit the self-interest of transient democratic majorities and to articu-
late the scope of permissible government regulation. In general, courts
sustained measures intended to promote public health, safety, morals, and
welfare,7' and invalidated efforts by factions to manipulate the demo-
cratic process through laws that bestowed special benefits on their mem-
bers or imposed distinct burdens on others.71 Within this context, the.
United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional laws that impaired the
contract rights of creditors or that diminished substantially the value of
their remedies.' Enacted under intense pressure of debtors during the
financial crisis of the late 1830s, the Court regarded these measures as
illegitimate attempts to harm the long-term public interest in commercial
security.
In their emphasis upon public welfare, Jacksonian judges recognized
that some vested rights threatened equality and personal liberty. They
differentiated between the right to acquire property and the accumulation,
through partial legislation, of economic privilege that subverted wide-
spread opportunity. For example, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge,73 Chief Justice Taney rejected the claim that the charter of a toll
bridge company conferred upon its proprietors a monopoly to operate a
bridge across the Charles River.74 Narrowly interpreting the language of
70 See, e.g., Vadine's Case, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 187 (1828) (sustaining a Boston li-
censing law for waste removal); GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 50-55 (discussing Jack-
sonian cases).
7' See, e.g., Wally's Heirs, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554; Cooper, 8 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599.
n See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (invalidating, under the
Contract Clause, an Illinois law that permitted defaulting mortgagors one year in which
to redeem foreclosed real property). In Bronson, the state legislature had enacted this
law in the aftermath of the Panic of 1837. No such provision existed when the parties
executed the mortgage contract. The Court ruled that the creation of an equitable re-
demption period destroyed the mortgagee's contract rights and remedies and thus im-
paired the underlying contract obligation. See id. at 317-20; see also Gantly's Lessee v.
Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 707 (1845) (invalidating an Indiana law requiring foreclosed
property to sell for at least half of its market value); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 608 (1844) (invalidating an Illinois requirement that foreclosed property sell
for at least two-thirds of its appraisal value).
73 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
71 See id. at 548-52. In 1785, Massachusetts granted investors in the Charles River
Bridge Company a charter for a toll bridge between Charlestown and Boston. Forty-
three years later the state chartered the adjacent toll-free Warren Bridge. By 1830, this
new bridge diverted traffic from the Charles River Bridge, whose proprietors unsuccess-
fully sought injunctive relief in Massachusetts. Before the Court, the investors argued
that the state's subsequent charter of the toll-free bridge substantially destroyed the
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the charter, Taney ruled that Massachusetts did not intend to give the
Charles River Bridge Company any exclusive rights.7' Consequently, no
impairment of vested contract rights occurred when the state subsequent-
ly chartered the toll-free Warren Bridge in the same location.76 Taney
essentially recognized that rigid application of the Contract Clause to
protect the investment interests of the Charles River Bridge proprietors
might hamper industrial progress and actually promote inefficient use of
the waterway. In this context, economic competition was essential be-
cause it encouraged technological improvements and presumably en-
hanced the public welfare.'
Committed to neither laissez-faire economics nor to abstract princi-
ples of natural rights, jurists influenced by the tenets of Jacksonian de-
mocracy shared a fundamental belief that the primary objective of the
law lay in the "release of individual energy."' They devised a jurispru-
dence that distinguished between permissible and impermissible uses of
governmental authority. This jurisprudence reflected traditional biases
against political factions and presaged the subsequent development of
substantive due process as a limitation upon state police powers.79
value of their exclusive franchise implicitly created by their 1785 charter. Id. at 447-61
(argument of Dutton, counsel for Plaintiffs in Error). Thus, the investors asserted that
the state violated its contractual obligation to refrain from interfering with or diminish-
ing the bridge's commercial enterprise. Id. at 444-45, 454, 457-58.
"' Taney believed the 1785 charter was a contract but concluded that it did not pre-
vent the state from chartering competing ventures. See id. at 548-52 (Taney, C.J.). "[I]n
grants by the public, nothing passes by implication." Id. at 546. Thus, the charter's
silence about exclusivity indicated it did not create a monopoly. See id. at 549.
76 See id. at 548-52. But see id. at 608-45 (Story, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Warren Bridge charter divested the claimants' contract and property rights).
' See id. at 552-53 (Taney, C.J.) (holding that an implied monopoly would retard
maximal waterway use and encourage waste). See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVI-
LEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971) (assert-
ing that Taney strictly construed the charter to promote local economic development
and to prevent stagnation of private vested rights).
78 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1967), quoted in GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 5
(discounting the notion that laissez-faire economics marked Jacksonian legal develop-
ment); see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829) (asserting that
the Constitution, not natural rights, limited state laws); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H.
199, 206-17 (1818) (holding that the state constitution, not natural rights, limited the
state legislature).
" See Benedict, supra note 12, at 325-26; Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra
note 1, at 58-61.
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D. The Emergence of Substantive Due Process as a Limitation Upon
Political Factions
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, substantive due pro-
cess emerged as an important limitation upon state police powers. Indus-
try flourished in the aftermath of the Civil Wai, yet for those who
worked in factories and for other laborers, economic opportunity dimin-
ished. Often unable to negotiate higher wages and improved working
conditions, industrial workers and others for whom the promise of eco-
nomic autonomy remained illusory exerted, through the democratic pro-
cess, tremendous pressure upon local governments to intervene in market
relations on their behalf.8' As a result, pursuant to their authority to pro-
mote public health, safety, morals, and welfare, states increasingly regu-
lated private economic activity.
Whereas before the Civil War local governments exercised their
police powers to foster economic development and commercial enter-
prise, after the war they used these powers to alleviate the harsh conse-
quences of rapid, large-scale industrialization.81 In defense of their prop-
erty rights, private businesses and others adversely affected by these laws
invoked the Due Process Clause of the recently enacted Fourteenth
Amendment82 and similar state constitutional provisions.
Initially set forth in the Magna Carta, due process was part of the
common law tradition the colonists brought to America. 3 Originally
perceived as a procedural safeguard to ensure that government did not
take one's life, liberty, or property without a judicial hearing," it
so See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 63, 76-79; HALL, supra note 47, at 197-203;
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 260 (1984) [hereinafter
Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era].
"1 See Benedict, supra note 12, at 327; see also Kens, supra note 8, at 74 (noting
that by the latter half of the nineteenth century the term "police powers" signified the
limits upon state police powers, whereas before the Civil War it referred to the broad
contours of state regulatory power). For discussion of antebellum police powers ideolo-
gy, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC (1993); see also HALL, supra note 47, at 88-89, 93-102 (discussing the
nexus between antebellum police powers and economic development); id. at 197-203
(discussing late nineteenth century local police powers and economic regulation).
82 "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
" See Kens, supra note 8, at 75. In relevant part, the Magna Carta provides: "No
freeman shall be captured or imprisoned or disseissed or outlawed or exiled or in any
way destroyed, nor will we go against him or send against him, except by lawful judg-
ment of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215).
' See Kens, supra note 8, at 75.
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evolved in the late nineteenth century into a substantive limitation upon
governmental authority. As antebellum judges distinguished between
laws that benefited the entire community and those that advanced the
narrow interests of a few, they implicitly used the power of judicial
review to assess the substantive effects of laws."5 Consequently, the
content of legislation became critical in determining its relevance to the
public welfare. State and federal judges fashioned the concept of sub-
stantive due process to protect the rights of those in the minority from
the whims and prejudices of transient democratic majorities. Increased
regulation of private economic affairs, therefore, gave the judiciary am-
ple opportunity to interpret due process as a constitutional guarantee and
to employ it as a limitation upon the scope of state police powers.
One jurist whose views became particularly influential was Thomas
Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, who published a comprehensive
analysis of constitutional government two months after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Entitled A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union, Cooley's book focused primarily upon state constitu-
tional law. Nevertheless, the principles it set forth were undoubtedly
intended by Cooley and understood by others to apply to the problems of
due process that arose in both state and federal litigation. Years later,
George Sutherland, a former law student of Cooley's at Michigan, based
much of his own Supreme Court analysis of economic liberty on the
work of his mentor.86
Cooley perceived in a written constitution the principal means of pro-
tecting individual rights from political factions and the tyranny of demo-
cratic majorities. 7 Deeply committed to equal opportunity and a foe of
85 An early due process case was Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)
(ruling that the due process clause of the New York Constitution limits governmental
power); see also, e.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167-69 (1853)
(invalidating class legislation that divested private property rights); Commonwealth v.
Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-88 (1851) (addressing limits of state police powers
and class legislation); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (suggesting that
some forms of class legislation may violate due process).
86 See PASCHAL, SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 10, at 16-
20, 36, 127, 170-72 (discussing Cooley's influence upon Sutherland). Sutherland attend-
ed Cooley's constitutional law lectures at the University of Michigan Law School in
1882.
8" See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
3, 35-37, 54-55 (Da Capo Press reprint ed. 1972) (1868) [hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS]. Cooley admonished against constitutional interpretation based
on "[t]he violence of public passion." Id. at 54-55.
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special privileges, Cooley, like other Jacksonian jurists, proclaimed the
virtue of general laws enacted for the public good and distinguished
them from partial laws of unequal operation.' While he acknowledged
the authority of states to regulate private property for the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of their citizens, he believed that courts had the duty
to make sure that states employed their police powers for the benefit of
all in a nondiscriminatory manner." He suggested that in determining
whether the government arbitrarily exercised its police powers to the
detriment of individual rights, courts should look at the substance of a
law and not merely at its form.'
Historical context and the common law, rather than natural rights or
laissez-faire economics, were the linchpins of Cooley's constitutional
jurisprudence.9 Custom and legal precedent, he thought, constrained
judges who otherwise might resolve questions of governmental authority
on the illusory basis of their personal predilections.92 A proponent of
88 See, e.g., People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486-87 (1870) (ruling that Michigan
could not pass preferential legislation for a railroad: "The state can have no favor-
ites ... and [should] ... give all the benefit of equal laws."). Cooley associated the
legitimacy of governmental action with laws of general application. See COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 355, 389-94. While the legislature could
"establish peculiar rules for the several occupations, and distinctions in the rights, obli-
gations, and legal capacities of different classes of citizens," id. at 390, it could not
impose particular obligations or burdens on one group "from which others in the
same ... class are exempt." Id. at 390-91. "Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities
unquestionably should be the aim of the law . . . ." Id. at 393; see also, e.g., GILLMAN,
supra note 12, at 57; JACOBS, supra note 8, at 27, 29, 31; Jones, supra note 12, at 755,
760, 764. Jones characterizes Cooley as a Jacksonian Democrat because of his general
opposition to partial laws and his penchant for equal economic opportunity. See id. at
752, 755-58, 760, 762-63.
9 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 357; Jones, supra
note 12, at 762-63 (discussing Cooley's recognition that the impartial exercise of local
police powers could protect property rights). See generally COOLEY, supra note 87, at
ch. 16 (discussing the permissible scope of state police powers).
90 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 355-56.
9' See id. at 22, 55-61. Cooley thought "constitutions ... [should] be construed in
the light of the common law . . . ." Id. at 60; see also TwiSS, supra note 8, at 22-25,
27, 30, 41 (discussing Cooley's common law emphasis); Jones, supra note 12, at 752,
757-64, 767-68, 770; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1489-91, 1497-1503, 1505,
1507-09, 1512-1515, 1540 (arguing Cooley's was an historist jurisprudence based pri-
marily upon historical consciousness and common law). Siegel contends that Cooley
"understood natural-law and historist jurisprudence as distinct enterprises." Id. at 1515.
92 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 50-54, 165-68; id.
at 167 (arguing that a court should not "substitute its own judgment for that of the leg-
islature" in the absence of a constitutional violation by the legislature); see also Jones,
supra note 12, at 761 ("By looking to history he meant to deprive judges of the right to
define due process on the basis of ... natural justice."); id. at 760-62. Due process of
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gradual change, Cooley considered historical context essential in ascer-
taining the meaning of constitutional provisions and their application to
contemporary problems.93 His view, therefore, that due process of law
protected private rights from the arbitrary exercise of governmental pow-
er reflected traditional concerns about political factions in a democratic
republic.94
A few years after the publication of Cooley's seminal treatise, the
United States Supreme Court began to address the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Within the context of
prescribing the parameters of governmental authority to regulate private
economic affairs, the Court devised a jurisprudence of substantive due
process that revealed its commitment to economic liberty and its aver-
sion to political factions. Associate Justice Stephen Field articulated this
notion in an 1877 case that involved the use of local police powers to
prescribe grain storage fees. In Munn v. Illinois,95 the Court sustained
Illinois's authority to regulate the prices charged by a private grain ware-
house. In dissent, Associate Justice Stephen Field sharply questioned the
premise that storing grain involved a significant public interest, when at
common law this activity was not a nuisance, and the company neither
dedicated its property to public use nor received special privileges from
the government that would warrant state control.96 Field believed that
the statute was a restraint upon economic liberty that operated unequally
when it impaired the use and value of private property for reasons that
bore scant relevance to the public welfare. The law arbitrarily restricted
the contractual freedom of one type of private business but left alone
others that similarly affected the public tangentially. Thus, Field in-
law "mean[t] its settled usage ... and we determine this by going to common law." Id.
at 759 (quoting III COOLEY LAW LECTURES 112 (Law Notebook of John Nelles Young)
(available in the University of Michigan Historical Collection)).
93 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 55-56; Jones, supra
note 12, at 757 n.26, 759, 763; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1493-95, 1499,
1501, 1505, 1507-08, 1513, 1515, 1540.
94 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 55-56; Jones,
supra note 12, at 752, 758-60, 764, 770.
9 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Waite reasoned that a
grain storage facility, although privately owned, "does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the com-
munity at large." Id. at 126.
9 See id. at 139-40 (Field, J., dissenting). Thomas Cooley also thought Chief Justice
Waite misinterpreted the common law and undermined private rights. See Jones, supra
note 12, at 767.
' See Munn, 94 U.S. at 140-45 (Field, J., dissenting). "No reason can be assigned to
justify legislation interfering with the legitimate profits of that business, that would not
equally justify an intermeddling with the business of every man in the community, so
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voked the Due Process Clause as a substantive limitation upon state
police powers to protect intangible property rights from the illegitimate
class legislation of political factions.98
Although expressed in dissent, Field's conception of substantive due
process ultimately prevailed until the 1930s. Indeed, judges consistently
recognized that title and ownership of property were meaningless without
some protection of its value and use.99 Increasingly, members of the
judiciary asserted their prerogative to preserve property rights from the
roiling passions of transient majorities eager to use the police powers of
the government to redress perceived inequities in industrial and market
relations. Through the power of judicial review, courts carefully scruti-
nized the substance of laws to ensure that they actually promoted public
health, safety, morals, or welfare." ° Justice Field himself explained
that:
If the courts could not.., examine.., the real character of
the act, but must accept the declaration of the legislature as
conclusive, the most valued rights of the citizen would be
subject to the arbitrary control of a temporary majority of
such bodies, instead of being protected by the guaranties of
the Constitution.10
soon, at least, as his business became generally useful." Id. at 154 (Field, J., dissenting).
98 See id. at 141-42, 145, 148, 154 (Field, J., dissenting). Field believed "[t]he deci-
sion of the [C]ourt ... gives unrestrained license to legislative will." Id. at 148 (Field,
J., dissenting).
" As Field noted in Munn: "All that is beneficial in property arises from its use, and
the fruits of that use; and whatever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is
desirable or valuable in the title and possession." Id. at 141 (Field, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (explaining that "courts are
not bound by mere forms ... [t]hey are at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legis-
lature has transcended the limits of its authority."). The Court sustained Kansas's prohi-
bition of the manufacture or sale of alcohol as a reasonable exercise of police powers.
See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (upholding a law that made fishing
with nets a criminal offense as a reasonable means of protection for fish and game).
101 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 696-97 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting); see
also STEPHEN FIELD, THE CENTENARY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (Feb. 4, 1890), reprinted in 24 AM. L. REV. 351, 361-68 (discussing the impor-
tance of judicial review as a means of preventing the tyranny of popular majorities
controlled by political factions).
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1. Liberty of Contract
Courts often reviewed police power regulations that interfered with the
freedom of individuals to pursue an otherwise lawful occupation. From these
cases emerged the idea that due process protected liberty of contract as a
right of both property and liberty.' Derived in essence from the common
law aversion to special privileges and the Jacksonian notion of equality,
liberty of contract reflected the fundamental premise that everyone has a
property right in his own labor. It also assumed that both employers and
employees were free to bargain on equal terms about conditions of employ-
ment and other related matters. To this extent, government intervention
on behalf of one group or the other was considered impermissible class, or
partial, legislation.
Justice Field and Justice Bradley both relied upon liberty of contract in
their dissents in The Slaughter-House Cases"° when they expressed their
opposition to a Louisiana law that created a monopoly that excluded inde-
pendent butchers from the slaughter business in New Orleans. Although a
majority of the Court sustained the act as a reasonable measure to promote
public health,0 5 the dissenters concluded that the legislature really con-
102 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dis-
senting) ("This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it
is the object of government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property
and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily as-
sailed."); see also Frorer v. People, 31 N.E. 395, 397-98 (111. 1892); JACOBS, supra note
8, at 24-25.
103 See JACOBS, supra note 8, at 65; McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract,"
supra note 26, at 24-26; see also Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 110 (Field, J., dissenting)
(citing in a footnote Adam Smith's observation in The Wealth of Nations that "The
Property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.").
1- 83 U.S. 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, I., dissenting); id. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). The 1869 act conferred upon the Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughterhouse
Company the exclusive right to operate a slaughterhouse designated for the destruction
of animals. The slaughterhouse was located just below New Orleans, some distance
from city residences, to prevent the spread of disease. This twenty-five year monopoly
authorized the company to permit independent butchers, prohibited by law from
slaughtering animals elsewhere in the city, to use its facilities upon the payment of
considerable fees. Independent butchers characterized the law as impermissible class
legislation that deprived them, in violation of the Constitution, of their liberty and prop-
erty interests attendant with the right to pursue an otherwise lawful trade. See id. at 48-
57 (argument of John A. Campbell, co-counsel for Plaintiffs in Error).
105 See id. at 60-66 (Miller, J.). In so holding, the Court. narrowly interpreted both the
Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
limited the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicating the slavery of African-Americans. See
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ferred an economic privilege upon one class of butchers to the detriment of
their competitors who sought to pursue the same livelihood."° While the
dissenters conceded that the state had the power to regulate the slaughter
business for health and safety reasons, they noted that the provisions at issue
did not involve the conduct of business, but rather excluded individuals for
reasons that bore little connection to public health."° Thus, they concluded
the law violated due process because it interfered with the independent
butchers' rights to acquire property upon the same terms as anyone else. As
such, the law represented impermissible class, or partial, legislation."
In essence, liberty of contract meant "the right to pursue any lawful
business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of
others . . . ." As a doctrine, courts used it to expand the scope of sub-
stantive due process as a limitation upon state police powers. With its em-
phasis upon equal operation of the law, liberty of contract enabled the judi-
ciary to consider the actual connection between legislative means and ends
to ensure that government did not infringe upon the personal rights of some
members of the community for the benefit of others. Consequently, state
and federal judges sustained as a legitimate exercise of police power those
laws that were substantially related to matters of public health, safety, mor-
als, or welfare, which, by their very nature, equally benefited or restrained
id. at 66-82.
106 See id. at 87-89, 93, 101-02, 105-07, 109-11 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 116-19,
122 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Both dissenters concluded, in part, that the Louisiana act
abridged the independent butchers' Fourteenth Amendment due process "right to pursue
a lawful and necessary calling" when it conferred a monopoly upon the Crescent City
Company. Id. at 88-89 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Bradley, in particular, believed the monopoly provision of the law violated
both the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses. See id. at 116-19, 122
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 87-89 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Both
Justices Field and Bradley conceded the state's regulation of the location where animals
were slaughtered was a reasonable exercise of local police powers. They, however,
distinguished this provision from the portion of the act that created a slaughterhouse
monopoly. As Justice Field explained, "[lI]t would not endanger the public health if
other persons were also permitted to carry on the same business within the same district
under similar conditions as to the inspection of the animals." Id. at 87 (Field, J., dis-
senting). Similarly, Justice Bradley commented that the monopoly provision "is not a
police regulation ... [i]t is one of those arbitrary and unjust laws made in the interests
of a few scheming individuals . . . ." Id. at 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
108 See id. at 88-89, 93, 101-02, 105-07, 109-11 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 116,
120, 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
"o Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring). Field agreed that a state could not contract away its police powers but
reiterated his view that freedom of contract comprised both a liberty and a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the
class legislation of political factions. See id. at 754-59 (Field, J. concurring).
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the public."' Conversely, courts invalidated under the Due Process Clause
partial laws whose remote connection to the public interest unduly interfered
with liberty of contract."'
Late nineteenth century judges considered as tenuous the correlation
between most legislative attempts to improve the wages and conditions of
labor and the public interest in health, safety, morals, and welfare. For ex-
ample, in In re Jacobs,"' the New York Court of Appeals found a law
that prohibited the manufacture of cigars in tenements to be unconstitutional.
Jacobs, who manufactured cigars in the apartment he shared with his family,
claimed the law interfered with his liberty of contract because it deprived
him of the use of his leased property to pursue an otherwise legal liveli-
hood.113 Although the law proclaimed itself a health measure, the court
concluded that it was an illegitimate exercise of state police powers because
it did not promote public health and because it arbitrarily prevented Jacobs
from making cigars. Accordingly, it was a partial law of unequal opera-
tion."'
In Lochner v. New York,"5 the United States Supreme Court also
adopted a narrow conception of state police powers when it invalidated a
portion of a New York labor law that prohibited bakers from working more
than sixty hours a week, or an average of ten hours a day."6 Unconvinced
110 See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (sustaining a Utah law regulating
hours of labor in mines and smelters); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888)
(sustaining a ban of butter substitutes); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (uphold-
ing the prohibition of the manufacture or sale of alcohol); Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27 (1885) (sustaining an ordinance closing laundries late at night).
... See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a law prohibiting
yellow-dog (anti-union) contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invali-
dating a maximum hours law for bakers); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895)
(holding that a law that limited women to a maximum of eight hours of daily factory
labor was unrelated to public health); Frorer v. People, 31 N.E. 395 (II. 1892) (invali-
dating a law requiring cash payment of wages); Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631 (I1. 1886)
(invalidating a law requiring coal mine operators to weigh coal on scales contempora-
neous to its extraction as an arbitrary interference with the price of labor); Godcharles
v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886) (invalidating, on liberty of contract grounds, a law re-
quiring cash payment of wages).
112 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
113 See id. at 101-02 (argument of Evarts et al., counsel for Respondents).
11 See id. at 105-06, 110, 112-15.
"' 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
116 See id. at 52-64. In Lochner, a Utica, New York bakery owner convicted of a
misdemeanor under 1897 N.Y. Laws ch. 415, art. 8, sec. 110, for having his employees
work beyond the prescribed statutory limit, claimed the maximum hours regulation was
impermissible class legislation. In Lochner, the Court held that the statute restricted the
contractual freedom of bakery owners and deprived them of liberty and property in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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that bakers' prolonged exposure to flour dust comprised a significant public
health risk, the Court found no substantial connection between the public
welfare and regulating the hours of labor in a bakery.117 Justice Peckham,
writing for the majority, expressed considerable skepticism about the
legislature's motives and characterized the labor measure as an illegitimate
exercise of state police powers that arbitrarily infringed upon the contractual
liberty of those in the baking industry." 8 For this reason, he concluded the
law operated unequally and invoked substantive due process to protect indi-
vidual rights from what he perceived was the misuse of governmental au-
thority by popular democratic majorities." 9
2. The Marginal Influence of Laissez-Faire Economics
Lochner is a particularly egregious example of how judicial aversion to
political factions helped produce an often sterile jurisprudence largely unaf-
fected by unprecedented socio-economic changes. Rather than acknowledge
the economic reality that bakers and other laborers rarely enjoyed freedom
of contract because of gross inequities in the market economy, 20 courts
117 See id. at 57-59, 61-64. While the Court acknowledged the state could regulate
bakeries pursuant to its police powers, it distinguished those sections of the law pertain-
ing to the physical conditions of the bakery workplace (sanitation, plumbing, and venti-
lation), which substantially advanced public health and safety, from the restriction of
labor hours. See id. at 61. The latter bore no connection to public health, safety, or
welfare. See id. "Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker
works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week." Id. at 57.
,8 See id. at 57, 61-64. Peckham explained that "[t]he act is not ... a health law,
but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employ-
ees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best . .. ."
Id. at 61. "[L]aws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police
power for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed
from other motives." Id. at 64.
19 See id. at 57, 59, 64. Peckham believed the maximum hours regulation was un-
necessary given the presumed equality of bakers and their employers in the bargaining
process. See id. at 57. The law was impermissible class legislation that subjected those
in the baking industry to "the mercy of legislative majorities." Id. at 59.
"~ See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 131-37, 153 (discussing Roscoe Pound and other
contemporary critics of Lochner). Pound, a leading proponent of "sociological jurispru-
dence," thought the main flaw of much of economic substantive due process was judi-
cial unwillingness to consider the sociological and economic context of the issues. See
generally Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence pt. 1, 24
HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911); id. pt. II, 25 HARv. L. REV. 140 (1911); id. pt. III, 25
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L.
REV. 605 (1908). Pound criticized Lochner era judges who "persist[ed] in the falla-
cy . . . of ... forc[ing] upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of
practical conditions of inequality." Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J.
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adhered to legal assumptions that underscored their antimajoritarian tenden-
cies, inviting speculation that substantive due process merely reflected the
views of an economic elite. Justice Holmes suggested as much in his
Lochner dissent in which he essentially accused the majority of substituting
laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism for dispassionate analysis of
the law.1
21
Although many Lochner era decisions seemingly bore these characteris-
tics, Holmes and the progressive historians who shared his assumptions
actually neglected the judges' more paramount concerns with equality and
the relationship between private rights and public authority.' Neither lais-
sez-faire economics nor Social Darwinism was the principal basis of consti-
tutional decision making during the height of economic substantive due pro-
cess. 1
23
Essentially an application of classical economic theory to the problems
of government, laissez-faire political economy presupposed a self-adjusting
economic system in which the natural laws of supply and demand, free from
government interference, would promote efficiency and prosperity." Val-
ue emanated from labor or from the bargaining process implicit in free ex-
change between individuals."z Competition and economic liberty were in-
454, 454 (1909). Pound attributed this lack of judicial pragmatism to "mechanical juris-
prudence" pursuant to which judges substituted the dry logic of the common law for
social and economic reality. d. at 457. He thought this artificial quality, not necessarily
judges' idiosyncratic socio-economic views, produced decisions like Lochner. Id. at 454,
457-58, 461-64, 480-81.
121 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Peckham
and the majority for deciding the case "upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain" and noting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"). Holmes said that "a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . ", id. (Holmes, J., dissenting), and
admonished his brethren not to use the Due Process Clause to "prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion." Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 10, 29, 87, 104-05, 114, 131, 153, 193, 199 (dis-
cussing conservative jurists' emphasis upon equal operation of the law and their anti-
factional bias); Benedict, supra note 12, at 297-98, 304-05, 311, 314, 331 (discussing
traditional emphasis upon liberty and impartial government); Jones, supra note 12, at
752, 755-58, 760, 763-66, 768, 770 (characterizing Thomas Cooley as a Jacksonian
jurist); McCurdy, supra note 26, at 33. Edward Corwin was the preeminent progressive
historian who adopted Holmes's interpretation of Lochner.
123 See generally GILLMAN, supra note 12 (contending that factional aversion rather
than laissez-faire economics best explains the pattern of Lochner era police powers
jurisprudence); Benedict, supra note 12 (discounting the influence of laissez-faire eco-
nomics); Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 403-04 (dismissing Social
Darwinism as an important influence); Jones, supra note 12 (placing Thomas Cooley in
a Jacksonian context); McCurdy, supra note 26, at 33.
124 See Twiss, supra note 8, at 8, 65; Benedict, supra note 12, at 299-301, 305.
'2 See Benedict, supra note 12, at 305; Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note
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tegral components of this theory, which assigned to government the near
singular role of removing monopolies and other artificial restraints from the
market. "' Laissez-faire adherents believed more widespread government
intervention into market relations would impair economic efficiency, which
they cherished more than contractual autonomy. 27
Initially formulated by Adam Smith in the late eighteenth century, clas-
sical economic theory never really influenced American jurisprudence to the
extent Holmes obliquely hinted in his Lochner dissent. Although many ju-
rists were undoubtedly familiar with the socio-economic views of laissez-
faire's most forceful proponents-the British philosopher Herbert Spencer
and his American acolyte, William Graham Sumner--they relied primarily
on common law notions of limited government and equality developed gen-
erations before the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations."s
Thomas Cooley, for example, doubted whether the law of supply and de-
mand can adequately resolve legal issues pertaining to wages and labor
conditions.'29
While Spencer and Sumner decried vigorously against virtually any kind
of governmental intervention in the economy, most Americans supported, to
some extent, corporate subsidies, protective tariffs, and tax exemptions in-
tended to benefit the public at large and to stimulate economic develop-
ment."3' Similarly, many people supported bimetallism and public educa-
tion, both of which were anathema to the more dogmatic, though relatively
few, adherents of the laissez-faire political economy.'
Between 1870 and 1920, courts sustained a variety of economic regula-
tions. 32 Concerned primarily with protecting private rights from the partial
laws of transient democratic majorities controlled by political factions, judg-
es distinguished between illegitimate and legitimate exercises of state police
powers. An abiding commitment to equal opportunity and individual liberty
8, at 403-04 (discussing Adam Smith).
' See Benedict, supra note 12, at 298-301, 305.
127 Id. at 304; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104
YALE L.J. 2309, 2316 (1995) (book review) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Fuller Court].
128 See Benedict, supra note 12, at 298, 314-17.
129 See Cooley, referring to the inadequacy of applying principles of laissez-faire
economics to employment issues, noted: "[I]t is easy with a wave of the hand to refer
them to the great law of demand and supply, but they return to plague us again and
again." Thomas M. Cooley, VI LECTURES ON CITY GOVERNMENT 52 (1879), quoted in
Jones, supra note 12, at 768.
130 See Benedict, supra note 12, at 301-04.
131 See id. at 301, 303. Benedict argues that while many people may have read Her-
bert Spencer, he probably exercised little influence upon Americans, in part, because of
his extreme views about limited government. See id. at 301 n.21, 310.
132 See Brown, supra note 17, at 944, 945 & n.11.
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marked their use of substantive due process, as they rarely relied upon no-
tions of economic efficiency.133
Moreover, Lochner era jurists did not use liberty of contract or other
aspects of substantive due process to protect the interests of an economic
elite." Highly skeptical of partial laws of any kind, judges like Cooley
and Field, while often solicitous of property rights, nevertheless distin-
guished the preservation of private property and economic opportunity from
the excesses of factional politics and unrestrained concentrations of wealth
detrimental to the public welfare.'35 During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, courts also invalidated occupational licensing schemes
intended to preserve the status quo and preclude newcomers from entry into
established businesses." From this perspective, it seems unlikely that
judges intended to perpetuate economic elitism.'37
Insofar as Lochner era jurists emphasized individual free will and equal
opportunity in their economic liberty decisions, they implicitly rejected
Social Darwinism as a constitutional norm.'38 Based on its assumption
about the finite amount of natural resources, Social Darwinism posited a
vision of evolutionary progress in which only the most fit individuals would
survive the process of natural selection.'39 Although subtle distinctions ex-
isted between Social Darwinism and laissez-faire economics, 4 ° more dog-
matic proponents of the latter invariably expressed views of Social Darwin-
"' See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 10, 29, 87, 104-05, 114, 131, 153, 193, 199;
Benedict, supra note 12, at 294, 297-98, 304-05, 311, 314, 325-26, 331; Jones, supra
note 12, at 752, 755-58, 760, 763-66, 770.
,34 See Benedict, supra note 12, at 294-97, 311, 331; Hovenkamp, Political Economy,
supra note 8, at 386-90.
135 See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (Field, J.) (sustaining a law
closing laundries late at night); People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (Cooley, J.) (in-
validating preferential railroad legislation); see also Jones, supra note 12, passim (dis-
cussing Cooley).
,36 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richey v. Smith, 84 P. 851, 854 (Wash. 1906) (invalidating
a licensing requirement for plumbers as partial legislation intended to discourage com-
petition and tenuously related to public welfare); Bessette v. People, 62 N.E. 215 (Ill.
1901) (invalidating a licensing requirement for horse-shoers as impermissible class leg-
islation unrelated to the public welfare).
137 See Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 388-90.
139 See id. at 418-20; see also Hovenkamp, Fuller Court, supra note 127, at 2324-25
(asserting that the sole reference to Social Darwinism in United States Supreme Court
cases is in Holmes's dissent in Lochner).
139 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV.
645, 664-71 (1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models]. For Social Darwin-
ists, the state played a minimal role in social progress, but it was expected to protect
individual economic rights. See id. at 668-71 (discussing Spencer and Sumner).
140 See Hovenkamp, Fuller Court, supra note 127, at 2324 & n.79 (differentiating
between classical political economy and Social Darwinism).
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ism in their pointed criticism of governmental authority and their approval
of ruthless competition. Given the marginal influence of Herbert Spencer
and William Graham Sumner, both of whom at times expressed their no-
tions of political economy in terms of natural selection,"' there is relative-
ly little evidence that judges relied upon Social Darwinism in their analyses
of state regulation any more than they applied principles of laissez-faire
economics. Indeed, for most judges, Social Darwinism merely represented
an abstract theory that never really addressed the relationship between indi-
vidual rights and governmental power."' Consequently, they refrained
from using it in their jurisprudence.
3. Historical Tradition and Common Law
Enthralled with history and the common law, judges of this era looked
to the past as an important guide for resolving constitutional issues. The
common law, with its emphasis upon precedent, enabled them to interpret
open-ended constitutional provisions such as due process with historical
custom and tradition in mind. 43 Thomas Cooley, in particular, imbued his
analysis of due process and the problems of class legislation with an acute
awareness of the interplay between legal development and historical experi-
ence. His was a jurisprudence that reflected an historist perspective in that it
drew upon traditional habits and customs rather than rational intuition to
understand the content and meaning of constitutional law.'" For Cooley
and many other jurists, history, rather than abstract theories such as laissez-
faire economics or Social Darwinism, was the basis of law. Knowledge of
historical tradition revealed the moral and legal principles of society, which
141 See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models, supra note 139, at 661-71; Hovenkamp,
Political Economy, supra note 8, at 418-20. See generally WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER,
ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER I & II, supra note 12; WILLIAM GRAHAM
SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE EACH OTHER, supra note 12.
141 See Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 418-20; Hovenkamp, Evolu-
tionary Models, supra note 139, at 661, 671.
143 See generally Siegel, Historism, supra note 11 (discussing the historist jurispru-
dence of Pomeroy, Tiedeman, and Cooley). Siegel defines historism as a form of "his-
torical consciousness." Id. at 1437 n.18. Factional aversion and an abiding respect for
equal operation of the law were the principal components of the historical custom upon
which Lochner era jurists relied. See Jones, supra note 12, at 752, 755-57, 759-64, 766-
67, 770-71 (placing Thomas Cooley in the historical context of Jacksonian democracy
and Jeffersonian republicanism); see also Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra
note 1, at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-99 (discussing the pervasive influence of com-
mon law and historism upon late nineteenth century jurisprudence).
'44 See Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 59-60; Jones, supra
note 12, at 757, 764; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1493-94, 1497-98, 1501-15,
1540.
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they thought evolved over time in response to gradual changes in social
customs and habits.'45 In contrast, Social Darwinism posited random
change that was essentially ahistorical,'" while laissez-faire economics
substituted concepts of efficiency for the pattern of social experience.
In their concern for protecting the rights of liberty and property of the
few from turbulent democratic majorities, Lochner era judges invariably
drew upon the historical customs and habits of previous generations. Com-
mon law doctrines, developed to limit governmental authority, augmented
this historical tradition and enabled judges to devise a police powers juris-
prudence that restrained political factions in a manner wholly consistent with
longstanding notions of judicial review and the public welfare. Although the
common law, in part, reflected natural law's emphasis upon inalienable
rights and equality, jurists throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries perceived a fundamental distinction between the two. Whereas
natural law involved questions of morality, the common law was far more
useful in determining the status of constitutional rights because its rules and
precedents were shaped by historical experience and social customs that
evolved over time.14 Largely discredited after the Civil War as a basis for
enforcing legal rights, natural law's illusory and abstract characteristics
rendered it particularly unsuitable as a constitutional norm.' Indeed, the
leading constitutional treatise writers of the period, Thomas Cooley and
145 See Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 59-60 (recognizing
the importance of historical context in constitutional interpretation); Jones, supra note
12, at 752, 755-57, 759-64, 766-67, 770-71 (discussing Cooley); Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 66-67, 70-71, 73-77, 82-83, 90.
146 See Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1444 & n.53, 1450-51, 1461 (discussing
John Pomeroy's non-Darwinian concept of legal evolution); id. at 1544.
147 See Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1435-37. Rather than base their concep-
tion of constitutional law solely on natural law, in which many jurists personally be-
lieved, these same jurists viewed constitutional issues from the perspective of historism,
which "conceived law as an evolving product of the mutual interaction of race, culture,
reason and events ... objective legal principles were discernible through historical
studies, not rationalistic introspection." Id. at 1435. Siegel concludes that historism
comprised the principal basis of late nineteenth century constitutional jurisprudence. See
id. at 1436. This Article contends that factional aversion and commitment to equal
opportunity were at the core of this historical consciousness, which is termed "historical
custom"; see also Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 66-67, 70-71, 73-
74, 82.
148 See Nelson, supra note 11, at 558-60 (explaining the inherent flaws of natural law
reasoning as applied to legal issues arising in post-Civil War industrial society); Siegel,
Historism, supra note 11, at 1435-37, 1450-51, 1489-1515 (discussing Cooley); id. at
1540-44 (explaining that common law and historical consciousness displaced natural
law in late nineteenth century jurisprudence); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra
note 1, at 63-66, 76-78, 80 & n.398, 82-90, 96 (discussing the primacy of common law
and history in constitutional adjudication).
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Christopher Tiedeman, rarely mentioned natural law in their analyses of
state police powers, preferring instead to interpret problems of governmental
power in a historical context that used common law principles.'49
In essence, the judges who construed substantive due process in histori-
cal terms and employed common law methods to assess the legitimacy of
state police powers created an inherently conservative jurisprudence. Skepti-
cal of abrupt changes and convinced that many attempts to redress industrial
conditions invited illegitimate class legislation, they insisted upon neutral
government action, even as economic realities rendered their assumptions
obsolete. 5 ° Even in the aftermath of Lochner, when faced with consider-
able criticism of its rigid methodology, the Supreme Court continued to
view labor reform measures as legitimate only if they substantially promoted
public health, safety, or welfare.' Although the Court appeared to retreat
from Lochner in subsequent cases in which it sustained maximum hours
laws,' it was not until the 1930s that a majority of the Court finally
149 See JACOBS, supra note 8, at 60 (discussing Tiedeman); Siegel, Historism, supra
note 11, at 1514-15; TWISS, supra note 8, at 126-27 (discussing Tiedeman). Cooley "be-
lieve[d] American constitutional norms are consonant with natural law. Yet, he never
draws directly from that source, and his landmark treatise mentions such concepts as
natural justice only rarely." Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1514 n.488; see also id.
at 1517, 1535 (discussing Tiedeman); Jones, supra note 12, at 760-63 (discussing Coo-
ley).
15 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 10-11, 153, 193, 199-203; Pound, Liberty of
Contract, supra note 120, at 454; Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era, supra note
80, at 260-61.
5 See, e.g., Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912) (upholding a law that forbid
billiard halls as a reasonable exercise of police powers); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S.
539, 550, 552 (1909) (upholding as a reasonable exercise of police powers a law that
required the weighing of pre-screened coal upon its extraction from mines to prevent
fraudulent underpayment of miners). But see Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917)
(invalidating a law that prohibited fees for employment agents as unrelated to police
powers); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a law prohibiting yellow-
dog contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a federal anti-
yellow-dog contract law). Many critics of Lochner did not advocate complete abandon-
ment of the traditional police powers categories. Instead, they urged courts to examine
more closely socio-economic data presented in cases about the effects of industrial con-
ditions upon workers' health, safety, morals, and welfare. See GILLMAN, supra note 12,
at 104, 131-37. Eventually, minimum wage advocates urged courts to accept the neces-
sity of increased governmental intervention in the market to redress bargaining inequi-
ties. See id. at 148-59 (discussing Herbert Croly and other critics of the myth of gov-
ernment neutrality).
152 See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (sustaining a ten hour daily
limit for factory workers as a reasonable health measure); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236
U.S. 385 (1915) (upholding a law that prohibited women from working in hospitals for
more than eight hours a day/forty-eight hours a week); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915) (upholding a law that prohibited women from working in hotels for more than
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abandoned the jurisprudential tenets of Lochner."'
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: THE
PRE-COURT YEARS
To many, George Sutherland's constitutional philosophy reflected theo-
ries of natural rights, laissez-faire political economy, and Social Darwinism.
Several progressive scholars writing after the New Deal regarded
Sutherland's economic liberty decisions, with their emphasis on individual
rights, as persistent remnants of an anachronistic, reactionary, and sterile
jurisprudence employed to protect the property interests of an economic
elite.'54 Others have regarded Sutherland more sympathetically, ascribing
to him a certain courage in his persistent defense of the judicial prerogative
to declare constitutional limitations upon governmental powers during an era
of extreme political and social turmoil. They see in his jurisprudence a time-
less appeal to natural rights, classical economics, or both, and argue that
Sutherland's concerns about the relationship between public and private
rights remain relevant today. 55
eight hours a day/forty-eight hours a week); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420-22
(1908) (sustaining a law restricting women to ten hours a day working in laundries or
factories as a law of equal operation that promoted public health and welfare as it ap-
plied to the physical well-being of women).
13 See Strong, supra note 8, at 452. Strong notes that West Coast Hotel "was of
especial moment because it constituted the last stand of justices who had long carried
the banner of Lochnerian economic philosophy." Id. But see GILLMAN, supra note 12,
at 175-93 (agreeing that West Coast Hotel displaced Lochner, but de-emphasizing the
earlier influence of laissez-faire economics).
,4 See Mason, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 52, 66-67, 73; Paschal, Mr.
Justice Sutherland, supra note 9, at 126-28; see also Kens, supra note 8, at 96-98;
Strong, supra note 8, at 452. See generally Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of
Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1924) [hereinafter Powell, Mini-
mum Wage Legislation] (criticizing Sutherland's opinion in Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital). For a more recent discussion of Sutherland's purported laissez-faire economic
views, see Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 412, 416-17, 437, 444-47.
Hovenkamp, however, rejects the association of classical political economic theory with
judicial motivation to protect an economic elite. See id. at 388-90. Elsewhere,
Hovenkamp suggests that Sutherland may have had an affinity for Social Darwinism.
See Hovenkamp, Fuller Court, supra note 127, at 2324 n.82.
'"s See, e.g., ARKES, supra note 11 (discussing Sutherland and natural rights); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 157-58
(1987) (equating maximum hours regulation and minimum wage regulation with special
interest laws); Richard A. Epstein, Toward A Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 732-38 (1984) (criticizing Hughes's majority opinion in Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell while extolling the virtues of the law and economics
movement); Steven J. Eagle, Bookshelf.- The Father of Natural Rights, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 1995, at A12 (book review praising Arkes's Sutherland biography and implicitly
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These views largely misconstrue Sutherland and distort the lessons of
his waning influence some sixty years ago in the area of economic substan-
tive due process. They portray Sutherland in ways that either advance or
denigrate a particular theory of modern jurisprudence. As a result, these
scholars have obscured the historical context of his ideas and oversimplified
his judicial motivations.
To best understand George Sutherland's constitutional philosophy, one
must shed preconceived notions and instead focus upon the patterns of his
legal and political thought. Close examination of his work in Congress and
as a member of the bar reveals the extent to which Sutherland was part of a
conservative judicial tradition that, instead of drawing primarily upon theo-
ries of natural rights, laissez-faire political economy, or Social Darwinism,
reflected an aversion to political factions and a passionate insistence upon
equal operation of the law. Sutherland's willingness to assign judges an
integral role in the vigilant application of constitutional limitations to protect
the rights of the few against the many emanated from his conception of
democracy and concerns with political tyranny and judicial legitimacy.
Throughout his public career, Sutherland articulated a set of principles
that reflected his inherent distrust of democratic majorities and his funda-
mental belief that the Constitution sets forth specific limitations of govern-
mental authority to preserve individual liberties. Close scrutiny of his
thought before he ascended to the Court shows a strong consistency, previ-
ously neglected by scholars, between some of his more "progressive" ideas
and his economic liberty decisions of the 1920s and 1930s.
A. Concept of Individual Rights
At the core of Sutherland's philosophy of law and government was his
deep concern for the individual. Presumably, at an early age, Sutherland
developed an earnest appreciation for hard work, initiative, and self-reliance.
Born in England and raised from infancy on the Utah frontier, Sutherland
experienced first hand the difficulties of pioneer life. His family struggled
financially during most of his youth, and at age twelve he left grammar
school to help support his family. He worked over the next few years, first
in a clothing store, then in the recording office of a mine, and later as an
agent for the Wells-Fargo express company.
56
endorsing both laissez-faire economics and natural rights).
156 Sutherland was born on March 25, 1862, in Stoney Stratford, Buckinghamshire,
England. His parents joined the Mormon Church that year, and the following year the
family emigrated to the Utah territory. Once in America, Sutherland's parents left the
Mormon Church and embarked upon a peripatetic existence throughout Utah and its
adjoining region. For biographical details of Sutherland's early life, see PASCHAL,
SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 10, at 3-5.
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In 1879, Sutherland resumed his formal education when he attended the
Brigham Young Academy (now university), where for two years he studied
with the school's founder, Professor Karl Maeser. Maeser, according to
Sutherland's principal biographer, Joel Francis Paschal, was an ardent ad-
mirer of British philosopher Herbert Spencer.'57 Spencer, during the latter
half of the nineteenth century, articulated a rather extreme notion of political
economy that drew upon the economic theory of Charles Malthus and that
paralleled the evolutionary concepts of biologist Charles Darwin.
Spencer posited that evolutionary forces shaped individuals. Over time,
people either adapted to and mastered their surroundings or perished in the
sometimes ruthless competition for limited resources. Survival of the fittest
marked the inexorable progress of humanity, with successive generations
more likely to thrive than preceding ones until society eventually attained a
state of perfection. Idealistic in its assumptions about human development,
Spencer's theory, called Social Darwinism, was considerably pessimistic
about the role of government in the quest for human perfection. Spencer
viewed individual liberty, as a prerequisite for successful evolutionary adap-
tation and gave government the especially narrow tasks of resolving person-
al disputes and preserving social order. Government intervention on behalf
of the less fortunate, or supposedly weaker, members of society merely
impeded the natural course of selection, which, when left alone, assured
survival of the most fit and the perpetuation of their adaptive attributes.
Spencer insisted that government pursue a steady course of noninterference
in virtually all commercial and social areas.'
Neither Karl Maeser nor his student George Sutherland endorsed
Spencer's views in their entirety. Maeser was a devout Mormon who taught
'5 See id. at 5-15 (discussing Maeser and his interest in Spencer).
1 See generally HERBERT SPENCER, EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND
PHYSICAL (London, Williams & Norgate 1861) (discussing Spencer's views on educa-
tion and social progress); SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE, supra note 12 (de-
veloping further Spencer's theories about natural selection, minimal government, indi-
vidualism, and social progress); HERBERT SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES (New York,
Lovell, Coryell 1880) (discussing science, moral principles, and evolutionary notions of
progress); HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO
HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED (London, J. Chapman 1851) (discussing political philoso-
phy, sociology, and evolution). All of these works discuss, to one extent or another,
Spencer's notion of Social Darwinism. See also WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, ESSAYS
OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER I & II, supra note 12 (applying Spencer's Social Dar-
winism to late nineteenth century America); WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL
CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER, supra note 12. Sumner, a Yale political philosophy
professor, was a leading American disciple of Herbert Spencer. For an overview of
Spencer and Sumner, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 31-66 (rev. ed. 1955); Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models, supra note 139, at
664-71; Hovenkamp, Fuller Court, supra note 127, at 2324-27; Hovenkamp, Political
Economy, supra note 8, at 417-20.
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his students to appreciate the moral dimensions of their actions and encour-
aged them to value personal sobriety, stability, and responsibility.'59 While
he generally approved of Spencer's emphasis on self-reliance and individual
liberty, Maeser questioned the rigidity and harsh implications of Social
Darwinism and particularly criticized the materialistic hue through which
Spencer viewed individual progress."6
Maeser quite possibly conveyed his misgivings to his students, for
Sutherland shared his mentor's ambivalence toward Social Darwinism. For
example, Sutherland's support of workmen's compensation bills and other
legislative measures that sought to improve working conditions drew upon
his recognition that material progress for some did not necessarily proceed
without tragic consequences for others. Speaking on behalf of a proposed
law that would substitute a compensation system for the often uncertain
damages sometimes available under common law negligence for workers in-
jured on the job, Sutherland observed:
There is a growing feeling that the individualistic theory has
been pushed with too much stress upon the dry logic of its
doctrines and too little regard for their practical operation
from the humanitarian point of view... we can not always
regulate our economic and social relations by scientific for-
mulae, because a good many people perversely insist upon
being fed and clothed and comforted by the practical rule of
thumb rather than by the exact rules of logic.'
61
159 See PASCHAL, SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 10, at 6-8.
160 See KARL G. MAESER, SCHOOL AND FIRESIDE 29-31 (1898) (transcript available
in the Karl G. Maeser Papers at Brigham Young University). Maeser characterized
Spencer's philosophy as "negative" and "materialistic" and referred to "the disintegrat-
ing tendencies of evolution." Id. at 30. Maeser urged that "true education ... must
resist the materialistic philosophy of evolution on the one hand, and the reactionary
theology of Catholicism on the other." Id. at 31.
161 George Sutherland, The Economic Value and Social Justice of a Compulsory and
Exclusive Workmen's Compensation Law, Address Before the Third Annual Convention
of the International Association of Casualty and Surety Underwriters 11 (July 14, 1913)
(Quebec, Canada) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Con-
gress), reprinted as S. DOC. No. 131 (1913) [hereinafter Sutherland, Economic Value
and Social Justice]. Earlier, in the context of supporting workmen's compensation for
railroad employees, Sutherland observed: "We must take care that these people do not
become wrecks, human driftwood in society. That is one object of this legislation. The
law of negligence is hard; it is unjust, it is cruel in its operation. The law of compensa-
tion proceeds upon broad humanitarian principles." 48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4853 (1912)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland).
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Sutherland regarded a worker's compensation law as a way of helping peo-
ple injured in industrial accidents to become less dependent on societal char-
ity and more self-dependent.
162
Although he consistently supported governmental measures to improve
working conditions, Sutherland worried that too much public interference
might "encourage the indolent .. ,163 In the same speech, he said, "In
framing our laws we must never lose sight of the vital distinction between
helplessness, which is a misfortune, and laziness, which is a vice.
''l
Sutherland thought democracy flourished when people retained the freedom
to pursue their natural skills and talents. "[I]ndividual initiative [and] self-
reliance ... were necessary to develop a real democracy."' 65 Largely a
self-made man, he perceived in all but the most helpless the capacity for
self-improvement through diligence and discipline. He assumed that when
left alone, most people used sound judgment and understood the moral con-
sequences of their actions, but he remained skeptical when confronted with
legislative measures that he thought weakened individual autonomy and
responsibility. 166
Sutherland confided these thoughts to labor leader Samuel Gompers in
1916 when he wrote that "[w]e must be careful not to overdo our legislation
and take from the individual the strengthening effect which comes from the
struggle to help himself.' ' 167 The following year, as President of the Ameri-
162 See Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 11-12; see
also 48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4853 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (explaining that
without a fixed compensation scheme "the injured man or the family that is left ... not
compensated ... [may] become a charge upon society").
163 Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 11.
I d. at 12.
165 Letter from George Sutherland to Henry M. Bates, Dean, University of Michigan
Law School (Apr. 21, 1937) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library
of Congress).
'66 In 1917, Sutherland addressed the relationship between individuals and govern-
ment. He remarked:
One objection to governmental interference with the personal habits, or even the
vices of the individual, is that it tends to weaken the effect of the self-convincing
moral standards and to put in their place fallible and changing conventions as the
test of right conduct, with the consequent loss of the strengthening value to the
individual of the free exercise of his rational choice of good rather than evil.
George Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, American Bar Association
Annual Address (Sept. 4, 1917) (Saratoga Springs, N.Y.) (transcript available in the
Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
REPORT OF THE 40TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssociATION 203
(1917) [hereinafter Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control].
67 Letter from George Sutherland to Samuel Gompers 3 (Jan. 15, 1916) (transcript
available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Letter to
Samuel Gompers].
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can Bar Association, Sutherland again took up this theme when speaking in
reference to the proliferation of proposed progressive social and economic
reforms. He said, "If widely indulged, such interference will not only fail to
bring about the good results intended to be produced, but will gravely
threaten the stability and further development of that sturdy individualism,
to which is due more than any other thing our present advanced civiliza-
tion. ' 1
68
Yet Sutherland's philosophy was neither a ruthless individualism that
dictated competition at all costs nor an apologia for the vast accumulation of
material wealth. Sympathetic toward those who, through no fault of their
own, were unable to become productive members of society, he supported
the use of governmental power to "stimulat[e] .. .personal effort ....,169
He also suggested that "the prime duty of society, and therefore the prime
study of the lawmaker, should be to prevent or minimize the evils which
give rise to the necessity for assisting the helpless ...."" In this respect,
Sutherland's views differed considerably from ardent Social Darwinists like
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, whose devotion to the con-
cept of survival of the fittest sanctioned government involvement only under
the most compelling circumstances.
Prosperity from honest effort and persistent hard work signified the
depth of character and initiative Sutherland believed essential to the contin-
ued development of democratic ideals. To this extent, he decried against the
thoughtless accumulation of material wealth and recognized that "[p]roperly
applied [wealth] enables us to make more of ourselves, or what is infinitely
better, to help others. 171 Moreover, throughout his life Sutherland re-
mained certain that the characteristics of self-reliance, initiative, and moral
responsibility made possible the progress of individuals and formed the
basis of a vital society.
B. The Relationship Between the Individual and Government
For Sutherland, individual liberty meant autonomy from governmental
interference "except where necessary to protect the liberties or rights of
other individuals or to safeguard society."'7 Aware of the implicit tension
between private rights and public order, he felt that by allowing individuals
to control their own conduct whenever possible, government would encour-
16 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 202.
169 Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 12.
170 Id.
171 George Sutherland, Commencement Address at Brigham Young University 7
(n.d.) (Provo, Utah) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Con-
gress) [hereinafter Brigham Young Commencement Address].
172 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 202.
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age personal initiative and responsible behavior. To this end, he stated that
"[i]ndividual liberty and the common good are not incompatible, but are
entirely consistent with one another." '73
Whereas Spencer and other acolytes of Social Darwinism may have
embraced the concept that the best government is that which governs least,
Sutherland rejected the more extreme implications of this notion. Just before
he became a member of the United States Supreme Court, Sutherland re-
marked:
The government which governs least is that of the savage
tribe, while the government which governs most is a des-
potism. Too little government and too much government lie
at the opposite extremities of social management, and both
are bad; for if too little government tends toward anarchy,
too much government carries us in the direction of tyranny
and oppression, and, in the language of Wendell Phillips,
"kills the self-help and energy of the governed."'74
In sharp disagreement with those who saw government as "an unnecessary
evil,"" 5 Sutherland chided others for expecting too much from it and re-
minded all that government emanated from the people. As such, government
reflected the people's strengths and weaknesses and therein lay its fallibili-
ty.' Sutherland recognized that government actually could protect and
enhance individual rights but realized that it was unlikely to do so without
limits upon the scope of its powers.
C. Concepts of Law and Democracy
Sutherland considered law an essential "prescription for future behav-
ior"'" and believed "that the rights and duties of the individual as a mem-
ber of society must be defined by pre-established laws . . . .,"' Lawmak-
ing ideally represented a deliberate process of compromise and concern for
long-term consequences. He deplored the initiative, referendum, and recall
173 Id. at 213.
174 George Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, Address Before the New York State
Bar Association 3 (Jan. 21, 1921) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?].
'75 Id. at 6.
176 See id.
177 George Sutherland, The Law and the People, Address Before the Pennsylvania
Society 6 (Dec. 13, 1913) (New York, N.Y.) (transcript available in the Sutherland
Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Sutherland, The Law and the People].
178 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 204.
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provisions favored by many progressive politicians and featured in the pro-
posed constitutions of New Mexico and Arizona because he thought that
they made possible in lawmaking the substitution of ephemeral popular
impulses for the sober judgment of elected representatives who had the
training and temperament to craft laws bearing a direct and practical rela-
tionship to the public welfare. 179 In contrast, Sutherland favored a federal
workmen's compensation bill because it carefully and evenhandedly re-
solved a longstanding socio-economic problem.'
Sutherland insisted that although government derived its authority from
the people, it functioned most effectively with a system of laws restraining
the passions and prejudices of the populace. Shortly before his appointment
to the Supreme Court Sutherland remarked:
Self-government ... means the exercise of sufficient self
restraint on the part of the people to uphold their own funda-
mental law against every temptation to subvert it ... for
only thus can we preserve the character of our institutions as
a government of laws and prevent their degeneration into a
chaos of fleeting and fickle emotion.8
"A government of laws" was far superior as a means of protecting individu-
al rights and liberties than was one where only human emotions and desires
guided officials. 2
179 The initiative and referendum enabled voters "to initiate and pass legislation with-
out reference to a legislature and to veto a legislative measure by a majority vote of the
people." GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF
MODERN AMERICA 1900-1912, at 81-82 (Harper Torchbooks 1962). Through "the re-
call ... an elected officer could be recalled from his office at any time a sufficient
number of the voters so expressed a desire." Id. at 82.
Pursuant to the Enabling Act of 1910, the Arizona and New Mexico territories
created constitutions, which they submitted for congressional approval in 1911 as a
prerequisite for becoming states. The Arizona constitution authorized the initiative,
referendum, and recall of elected officials and judges. See id. at 264. Recall of judges
reflected widespread dissatisfaction among laborers, reformers, and progressive politi-
cians with judges who seemingly thwarted socio-economic reform legislation in order to
preserve the interests of an economic elite. Recall of judges and of unpopular decisions
therefore represented an attempt to restrict the power of judicial review. See id. at 265.
Sutherland believed that the initiative, referendum, and recall would make some leg-
islators more likely to enact laws hastily out of a desire to keep their jobs than out of
genuine concern for the public welfare. See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2800 (1911) (state-
ment of Sen. Sutherland).
,80 48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4851-54, 4859 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland);
Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 4-11.
181 Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 8-9.
182 Id.; Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 6 (equating recall of
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Sutherland particularly emphasized the paramount importance of the
government making laws that have as their objective similar treatment of all
affected individuals and that result in such treatment.1"3 Equality in creat-
ing the law and in its application were principles from which Sutherland
rarely, if ever, deviated. Accordingly, he supported the federal workmen's
compensation law"u and women's suffrage." 5 Ultimately, Sutherland's
insistence upon equality contributed to both the principal attributes and
weaknesses of his jurisprudence. Sutherland's pursuit of this ideal at times
may unwittingly have placed insurmountable barriers to his ability to proper-
ly assess various social and economic reforms,"8 6 thereby contributing to
the popular misconception that his jurisprudence reflected the influences of
laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism.
In large part, Sutherland's dogged insistence upon "the impartial re-
straint of the law" ' 7 emanated from his understanding of democracy and
its inherent flaws. He contended that "pure democracy was a ... deceptive
ideality [sic],"'88 ill-suited for a large and complex society and unable to
judicial decisions with illegitimate partial laws that only reflect the ephemeral whims of
popular democratic majorities); Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control,
supra note 166, at 204.
183 See Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 204.
184 See Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 8-11.
Sutherland believed a fixed compensation scheme would "equalize the [economic] bur-
den" between employers and injured industrial workers. Id. at 8. Prescribed compensa-
tion for industrial accidents would limit individual recovery awards, but it would also
reduce the uncertainty of obtaining damages in negligence suits. This would enable a
broader segment of the workers to recover some compensation, as employers no longer
would be subject to disproportionate awards that depleted their financial resources to
compensate other similarly injured workers. Sutherland endorsed this concept of "aver-
age justice," id. at 8, noting that "it is better that everybody injured should receive com-
pensation than that only a portion of those injured should receive damages and the re-
mainder nothing." Id. at 10; see also 48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4854 (1912) (statement of
Sen. Sutherland). For similar reasons, in 1916, Sutherland also introduced in Congress
another workmen's compensation bill for federal employees. See 53 id. at 452 (1916)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland).
185 See 51 CONG. REc. 3598-3601 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). In 1915,
Sutherland introduced a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to give
women the right to vote. See 53 id. at 75 (1915) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). He
thought denying women suffrage was "purely artificial ... unjust and [an] intolerant
denial[] of equality ..... Id. at 11,318 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
186 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400-14 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-
83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
187 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 204.
188 George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before the Ameri-
can Bar Association (August 28, 1912) (Milwaukee, Wis.), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
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restrain "the passing whims and caprices and fleeting emotions of the con-
stantly changing numerical majority." ' 9 The constitutional Framers, there-
fore, "established a representative republic---a self-limited democracy as dis-
tinguished from an unlimited democracy. '
Sutherland assailed the initiative and referendum as an attempt to under-
mine representative democracy and the deliberate nature of lawmaking.
Allowing the people to frame, interpret, and execute the laws would sup-
plant the sober reflection of carefully selected representatives entrusted with
the responsibility of making laws for the public welfare.' Sutherland
thought these reforms encouraged lawmaking marred by "careless ignorance
of the facts"'92 in response to the ephemeral whims of transient majorities
eager to further their own interests at the expense of the long-term public
good. He considered the proposed recall of elected officials and unpopular
judicial decisions especially troublesome because such recalls would make
public officials more dependent upon the whims of the populace and less
likely to act in furtherance of the public welfare. 3
Sutherland inherently distrusted democratic majorities and throughout his
public career remained skeptical of laws enacted to implement the tides of
popular sentiment. Progressive measures like the initiative, referendum, and
recall, which would make possible more direct participation of the public in
the otherwise deliberate and gradual process of lawmaking, presented, he
believed, significant threats to stable social change and to individual rights.
In this regard, Sutherland remarked that "the will of the people as expressed
from time to time through the decrees of the changing majority may be
often unwise and sometimes unjust . ,,.." In other words, simply be-
cause a popular majority demanded a particular course of action did not
mean it was the most prudent long-run solution. 5 For Sutherland, there
372 (1912) [hereinafter Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution].
89 Id. at 373.
190 Id.
191 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2797-98, 2800, 2802 (1911) (statement of Sen.
Sutherland). Essentially, Sutherland perceived in the initiative and referendum an effec-
tive means for political factions to manipulate democratic majorities and further threaten
the rights of unpopular minority groups. No longer would laws be the product of com-
promise and of "the deliberate interchange of conflicting opinion." Id. at 2798. They
"would be framed, not by those who see the situation from different angles, but by
those who all occupy the same point of view." Id.
92 Id. at 2800. The initiative and referendum would undermine representative democ-
racy because they would prevent elected representatives from acting as a truly delibera-
tive body for the benefit of all rather than for particular factions. See id.
193 See id.
9 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 381.
'95 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2796 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); Sutherland,
The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 3, In 1917, Sutherland said, "A foolish law
does not become a wise law because it is approved by a great many people."
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was "no greater delusion than to suppose that by putting a ballot into the
hands of a voter you thereby put wisdom into his head ....
Sutherland's principal concern lay with transient majorities whose dis-
proportionate influence and ephemeral nature made them particularly inept
at protecting the rights and liberties of individuals who, for one reason or
another, were not members of the dominant group(s). For Sutherland, fleet-
ing democratic majorities often promoted their own interests at the expense
of others.'97 Indeed, he warned that they "subvert the liberties of the indi-
viduals, who in alternation may constitute the majority today and the minor-
ity tomorrow . . .,."" Instead, Sutherland trusted "the wisdom and the jus-
tice of the persistent majority," whose will emerged over time through the
deliberate process of legislative compromise.'
Sutherland considered transient democratic majorities vulnerable to the
control of political factions for whom self-interest and expediency were
more important than the public welfare.' ° He thought factions were re-
sponsible for the creation of laws that benefited one group at the expense of
another and often characterized these laws as class, or partial, legisla-
tion.2'" To Sutherland, class legislation was "the most odious form of leg-
islative abuse"2 2 because it ignored the premise that the "law ... shall
operate generally"' ° and impermissibly allowed government to distinguish
between citizens upon the basis of factions. Consequently, he criticized the
many "statutes ... which select for privilege one class of great voting
strength or set apart for special burdens another class of small numerical
power at the polls."''
In addition, Sutherland found class legislation offensive because of its
tendency to delegitimize individual initiative, self-reliance, and merit. In
Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 203.
' Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 383.
See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 6 (equating the recall
of judicial decisions with illegitimate class legislation and noting the pernicious self-
interest of factions).
198 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 381.
19 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
20o See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 6.
201 Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 19. Sutherland implied
that class legislation "may constitute the first link in a chain of precedents which, be-
ginning in necessity, passes from one gradation to another until, at length, it rests in
mere favor." Id.
202 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 212.
203 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 384.
204 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 212.
Moreover, "any law which arbitrarily separates men into classes to be punished or re-
warded, not according to what they do but according to the class to which they are
assigned, is odious and despotic, no matter how large a majority may have approved it."
Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 19.
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1921, in reference to the popular clamor for increased government regula-
tion, he observed:
[Flor if the hand of power shall ever be permitted to take
from "A" and give to "B" merely because "A" has much and
"B" has little, we shall have taken the first step upon that
unhappy path which leads from a republic where every man
may rise in proportion to his energy and ability, to a com-
mune where energy and sloth, ability and ignorance, occupy
in common the same dead level of individual despair. 5
This perspective provides an essential context from which to assess
Sutherland's views of social and economic reform during his years in Con-
gress; it also explains, in part, the pattern of his economic liberty decisions
on the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Sutherland found the initiative, referendum, and recall
pernicious forms of class legislation. They would remove the protective
barriers of representative democracy and unleash the untamed passions and
whims of tyrannical, transient democratic majorities. Without much delibera-
tion and compromise, single interest factions would enact laws of unequal
operation that would favor a select few at the expense of others.2 Simi-
larly, he opposed the Underwood Tariff Bill of 1913, calling it "sectional in
character and grossly unequal in its provisions" because it protected South-
ern rice and cotton producers with high tariffs but reduced the tariffs on
sugar and wool from Western farmers.'
Moreover, Sutherland's commitment to legal equality explains his sup-
port for women's suffrage and a federal workmen's compensation law for
interstate railroad employees. Appalled and bewildered by the exclusion of
women from the election process, he decried against their disparate treat-
ment on the basis of gender and invoked their rights as individuals to legal
equality.2"
" Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 18-19.
See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2794-95, 2797-98, 2800 (1911) (statement of Sen.
Sutherland).
207 50 id. at 4285, 4297 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Sutherland stressed
the need for a protective tariff based upon "a definite and defensible policy of general
application" and decried against "the artificial inequalities of special privilege." Id; see
also 44 id. at 2080 (1909) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (supporting the protective
tariff proposed in the 1908 Republican party platform). Sutherland's consistent support
of protective tariffs further differentiated him from laissez-faire political economists like
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner.
" See 51 id. at 3598, 3600-01 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). "If it be right
to extend the voting privilege to all sorts and conditions of men, I am not quite able to
see the justice of denying the same right to all sorts and conditions of women." Id. at
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As chair of a federal commission that studied industrial accident com-
pensation, Sutherland recommended a compensation scheme that would
award fixed sums to all injured laborers regardless of fault. Under the com-
mon law standard, which placed limits on damages and required laborers to
prove the fault of employers, compensation was speculative and often ineq-
uitable; similarly injured workers could receive unequal damages if an em-
ployer had depleted its financial resources while defending previous suits.
Sutherland proposed a compromise plan that would substitute certainty for
unpredictability, permit the equal treatment of laborers and employers alike,
and, in theory, create an incentive to prevent industrial accidents.2'
Another problem Sutherland attributed to transient democratic majorities
was the "tendency ... to over-legislate,"2 ' which he characterized as a
"mania for regulating people. '21' In a speech before the New York Bar
Association, he observed, though not for the first time, that: "Too many
laws are being passed in haste. Too many that simply reflect a temporary
prejudice, a passing fad, a fleeting whim, a superficial view or an exaggerat-
ed estimate of the extent, or a mistaken impression of the quality of an
evil. 2
12
Laws born of political expediency thwarted personal initiative, self-reli-
ance, and responsibility, which, for Sutherland, were the true cornerstones of
the public welfare rather than the narrow interests of transient democratic
majorities and factions.213 Instead, he counselled care and caution in the
3601; see also 53 id. at 11,318 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); id. at 75 (1915)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland) (introducing a joint resolution for a constitutional amend-
ment for women's suffrage); George Sutherland, Speech at Women's Suffrage Meeting,
Belasco Theatre 3-4 (Dec. 12, 1915) (Washington, D.C.) (transcript available in the
Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress).
See Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 5-11. As
Sutherland explained, "[T]he compensation law substitutes the communistic idea of
benefit for the whole class in place of the individualistic theory which permits a minori-
ty of the class to recover much and the majority little or nothing." Id. at 9; see also 48
CONG. REC. 4846, 4854 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Sutherland used many of
these arguments in support of a federal workmen's compensation bill he introduced in
the Senate. See 53 id. at 452 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
210 Letter from George Sutherland to Horace H. Smith (Mar. 2, 1921) (transcript
available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Letter to
Horace Smith]; see also 48 CONG. REC. 4846, 4851 (1912) (statement of Sen.
Sutherland).
2" Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 201.
212 Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 20. Four years earlier as
the American Bar Association President, Sutherland remarked, "The trouble with much
of our legislation is that the legislator has mistaken emotion for wisdom, impulse for
knowledge, and good intention for sound judgment." Sutherland, Private Rights and
Government Control, supra note 166, at 199.
213 See Letter to Horace Smith, supra note 210 (discussing the plethora of laws that
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enactment of laws, confident that over time "[m]ost... evils, if left alone,
would disappear under the powerful pressure of public sentiment . ..
People would then be able to differentiate between true public necessity and
the artifice of "doubtful experiment."215
D. Progressive Conservatism
Progress, for Sutherland, meant careful and deliberate change in re-
sponse to significant new conditions and proven necessity, rather than in
deference to political expediency and the whims of fleeting popular majori-
ties. Not all change signified progress, which he measured by improvement,
although imperceptible at times, in individuals and communities.216 He also
"distinguish[ed] between real progress and what amounts to a mere manifes-
tation of the speed mania.""" At the height of the Progressive movement,
Sutherland emerged as a leading critic of reforms like the initiative, referen-
dum, and recall, which he considered careless and unwise because they
reflected the emotional turbulence of democratic society. He feared they
would make possible an increase in ill-conceived and shortsighted legislation
ultimately detrimental to the public welfare. 8
Skeptical of hasty experiment and sharply critical of change for its own
sake, Sutherland believed caution and common sense were essential to the
attainment of progress.1 9 Only then could society avoid "sudden and ill-
considered determinations based upon transitory passion or emotion which,
in the illuminating light of reflection and experience, must thereafter be
abandoned as ill-advised or misconceived."'22 He further exhorted individ-
uals "to rely upon their sober and deliberate convictions rather than upon
their impulses, which, however honest, are more likely to reflect their de-
sires than their judgment. 221
Individual progress and the advancement of society occurred gradually
as part of an evolutionary process, marked not as Herbert Spencer and the
Social Darwinists thought by survival of the fittest, but instead by occasion-
"penalize a lot of things that ought to be left to the individual to determine for him-
self"); Sutherland, Brigham Young University Commencement Address, supra note 171,
at 9 (praising the virtues of self-reliance, perseverance, and personal responsibility);
Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 199 (suggesting
that many statutes are unnecessary because they do not promote the public welfare).
214 Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 200.
215 Id. at 20i.
216 See Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 7, 21.
217 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
216 See id. at 2794-95, 2797-98, 2800, 2803.
219 See id. at 2795.
' Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 383.
2" Id. at 382-83.
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al fits and starts tempered by careful action and cautious optimism. More-
over, Sutherland did not reflexively regard government as an impediment to
progress; rather, he preferred to focus on ways it could increase its effec-
tiveness in promoting the long range public good. Government made prog-
ress possible by "thoroughgoing investigation, dispassionate consider-
ation . . and ... courageous patience which moves deliberately in the face
of clamorous demands to make haste.,
222
Essentially, Sutherland believed that the true path of progress lay in "the
methodical habits of the past .... ,,' He considered himself "to be fairly
progressive ... [with a] tendency to put a good deal of faith in experience
and very little in mere experiment .... '" Experience provided the criti-
cal perspective from which to assess both the necessity for and type of
change most practical under the circumstances. As Sutherland explained:
We learn to distinguish what is wise and right from what is
wrong and foolish by experience which compels our assent
rather than by precept which only advises our understanding;
molding by evolutionary rather than by revolutionary meth-
ods the fundamental principles of law and government into
appropriate form.2z
Afraid that change too abrupt or cataclysmic might "generate[] consequences
more seriously unfortunate than the original evil itself,'' 21 Sutherland re-
garded experience as a critical tool for the maintenance of an effective and
responsible government.227
Insofar as radical or ill-conceived change worried Sutherland, he consid-
ered blind adherence to the past just as foolish and pernicious to the public
welfare.2' His support of women's suffrage and of a federal workmen's
2n 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
Id. (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 6-7. Elsewhere,
Sutherland said: "I am no standpatter. I am not in favor of standing still." 47 CONG.
REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
George Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, UTAH INDEPEN-
DENT 2 (1912) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?]. "On the whole I
entertain a profound regard for notions which have long persisted, because, having
passed the scrutiny and survived the buffetings of time, they are more likely to be right
than wrong .... ." 51 CONG. REC. 3598, 3600 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
" Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 8.
22' See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2803 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). "[I]n the
main and in the long run changes which come by the gradual and orderly processes of
evolution are better and far more enduring than those brought about by the spasmodic
methods of revolution. Experience is a safer guide than prediction." Id.
See 51 id. at 3598, 3600 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (noting that "tradi-
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compensation law exemplifies his willingness to depart from traditions that
he considered obsolete.229  Although not especially reactionary,
Sutherland's notion of progress reflected his innate conservatism and his
abiding faith in the lessons of experience.
E. The Constitutional Philosophy of George Sutherland
As one deeply interested in the theory and practice of American govern-
ment, George Sutherland held the Constitution in the highest esteem. He
often referred to it as the soul of the country23° and regarded it as the
foundation for a government of laws." Emanating from the popular will
and "a solemn covenant of all the people," 2 the Constitution represented
the fundamental law of the land, supreme over all persons and branches of
government. 233 It comprised the basis of governmental authority and made
possible the progress of a democratic republic "along sane and symmetrical
lines."'  Specific provisions conferred certain powers, either directly or by
implication, upon the federal government and reserved others to the states,
but as a whole the Constitution set forth a concept of limited government
intended to preserve and protect individual rights and liberties.
For Sutherland, the Constitution served an integral role in the restraint of
transient democratic majorities. Years before he became a Supreme Court
Justice he remarked:
tion ... has been responsible for the perpetuation of a good deal of foolishness ..
Earlier, Sutherland said that "[t]o oppose a new thing simply because it is new is quite
as bad as to insist upon change merely because it is change." 47 id. 2793, 2795 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland); see also Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note
174, at 7.
229 See 51 CONG. REC. 3598, 3600-01 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); 48 id. at
4846, 4851 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) ("We have outgrown the system of
employers' liability under the common law. It has no longer application to our industri-
al conditions."); see also Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note
161, at 4.
2' See Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 1;
Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 392.
231 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
232 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 375; 47 CONG.
REC. 2793, 2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
13 See Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 8; George Sutherland,
Address Before the Utah State Bar Association (1924), reprinted -in STATE BAR Ass'N
OF UTAH, 1924 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF UTAH 65 [hereinafter Utah State Bar Association Address]; Sutherland,
The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 6.
234 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2803 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
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Constitutions are made not only for the purpose of confining
the representative agents of the people within definite bound-
aries, but also for the purpose of presenting hasty, ill-consid-
ered, and unjust action on the part of the majority of the
people themselves. The written constitution is the shelter and
the bulwark of what might otherwise be a helpless minori-
ty.
5
Sutherland realized that in an unlimited democracy individuals are vulnera-
ble to "the transitory opinions of a constantly changing majority."' With-
out restrictions, factions could exercise the powers of government tyranni-
cally by promoting their own interests in ways harmful to others. From this
perspective, Sutherland viewed the Constitution as:
the shield of the weak against the powerful and of the few
against the many. The majority can always take care of itself
but without the checks of the Constitution the minority
would live under the constant menace of the dangers which
flow from sudden popular emotion or prejudice."
Sutherland also emphasized the differences between the Constitution and
legislation. First, the limitations the Constitution placed on governmental
power necessarily made it the supreme legal authority. Laws or other actions
of government that transgressed constitutional limits were invalid. 8 In ad-
dition, the principles of the Constitution were largely immutable and "eter-
nal," subject to alteration only by the protracted process of amendment. 9
The Constitution, from Sutherland's perspective, was a "declaration[] of the
permanent, settled, broadly fundamental policies of the State, not to be
lightly altered upon the mere caprice of the moment, but only after the most
23' Id. at 2800.
2"6 Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 4; see
also George Sutherland, The Constitutional Aspect of Government Ownership, Address
Before the Missouri Bar Association 13 (Sept. 29, 1915) (transcript available in the
Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Sutherland, Constitutional
Aspect of Government Ownership]; Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note
177, at 7 ("The guaranties of the Constitution are primarily for the protection of the
minority.").
237 George Sutherland, Undated/Untitled Speech 2 (transcript available in the
Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress).
23 See Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 8.
23 Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 1;
Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 8.
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serious and deliberate consideration."' " Conversely, laws changed relative-
ly rapidly in response to the ebb and flow of public opinions and needs."
Moreover, Sutherland attached considerable significance to the Constitu-
tion as a written document He believed this quality helped it "prevent ill-
considered and impulsive action ... " Amendment of the Constitution
required "sober reflection"" as part of a slow and deliberate process in-
tended to arrest "the drastic and dangerous expedient of constitutional viola-
tion" that would otherwise occur if the people could alter it impulsively.
Rather than impede progress, the written principles of the Constitution
helped create the stability and sense of permanency essential for a govern-
ment based upon equality and the impartial restraint of the law.
Invariably, Sutherland's strict construction of constitutional limitations
reflected his conviction that the meaning of the Constitution must remain the
same over time in order to preserve individual rights and liberties from
transient democratic majorities." Acutely aware that perceived exigency
and the desires of the moment might dull the constitutional sensibilities of
political factions, Sutherland insisted that reform was illusory and damaged
the public welfare if it transgressed the limits of the Constitution.2"
Sutherland recognized the tension between the fundamental concept of
limited government and the demands of a progressive society. Constitutional
restrictions on the powers of government were necessary to protect individu-
al rights against incursion from the most well-meaning of democratic major-
ities. Conversely, he worried that "[a] constitution incapable of adaptation to
the constant growth and constant change of a progressive and constantly
140 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). Although
Sutherland made this statement in reference to state constitutions, he clearly held similar
views about the United States Constitution.
241 See id. (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
242 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 376; Sutherland,
What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 3.
13 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 376.
Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 3.
", See id. at 3-4. "The great purpose of the Constitution is to ... preserve the rights
of the citizen by the definite and unchanging law of the land, instead of leaving him at
the mercy of the transitory opinions of a constantly changing majority." Id. at 4. Else-
where, Sutherland commented that "[t]he written constitution is the shelter and the bul-
wark of what might otherwise be a helpless minority." 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2800
(1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); see also Sutherland, Constitutional Aspect of
Government Ownership, supra note 236, at 12.
246 See 49 CONG. REC. 2903, 2911 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (expressing
concern about violating the Constitution "In order to bring about a good result" in the
interest of expediency and arguing that a bill prohibiting interstate commerce in liquor
was unconstitutional because it gave states a power that belonged only to the federal
government under the Commerce Clause).
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changing people would be a useless and an impossible contrivance, serving
only to hamper, and not to promote, the development of a free people." 7
Sutherland did not perceive the Constitution as a barrier to reform, nor
did he seek to invoke its limitations to preserve the status quo or to protect
an economic elite. Rather, he considered the principal task of a constitution-
al democracy to be the encouragement of progress within the limits of pre-
scribed governmental authority. To accomplish reform through unconstitu-
tional means ultimately subverted the primacy of the Constitution and ren-
dered its principles meaningless."8 Thus, Sutherland approved of broaden-
ing the scope of constitutional provisions to meet "changing social, industri-
al and economic conditions" so long as this did "not alter the meaning of
the [C]onstitution.""
F. The Judicial Prerogative in a Constitutional Democracy
Even before he became a Supreme Court Justice, George Sutherland
recognized the critical importance of the judiciary in a constitutional system
that limited governmental power to protect individual rights. Indeed, many
of his pre-Court ideas anticipated his judicial opinions and thus provide an
essential context from which to understand his jurisprudence.
Sutherland perceived in an independent judiciary the principal means of
restraining transient democratic majorities. Although the Constitution set
forth the concept of a limited government, only the judiciary, free from the
political demands of making and executing the laws, could ensure'that those
in power observed the constitutional limits of their authority. 5 In 1912
Sutherland suggested:
[I]f constitutional and orderly government is to endure there
is but one course for the courts to follow, and that is to set
their faces steadily and unswervingly against any palpable
violation of that great instrument, no matter how overwhelm-
ing in the particular instance may be the popular sentiment,
or how strong the necessity may seem, for if the door be
247 45 id. at 2613, 2619 (1910) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (supporting a postal
savings depositories bill as within the federal government's Commerce Clause powers).
" See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 384. "Consti-
tutional principles would be of little value unless they were permanent and predeter-
mined. You cannot make impartial rules while the controversy is pending any more
than you can prescribe rules for a game while it is in progress." Id.; see also 49 CONG.
REC. 2903, 2911 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
249 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 391.
See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2802 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); Sutherland,
The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 4-6.
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opened to such violation or evasion on the ground of neces-
sity we shall be unable to close it against expediency or
mere convenience.251
As impartial arbiters of disputes, courts could uphold the primacy of the
Constitution and its emphasis upon the equal operation of the laws.52
Judges had an important obligation to assess issues of power using constitu-
tional principles; the relative popularity or perceived wisdom of a particular
statute or course Of action were not appropriate guides for adjudication.2 3
Instead, Sutherland thought judges should "simply ... declare and apply the
law" of the Constitution in order to preserve individual rights from the
whims of fleeting popular majorities. 254 That courts on occasion invali-
dated laws on constitutional grounds made them neither blameworthy nor
especially reactionary. 55 Sutherland believed judicial review was an essen-
tial prerogative in a limited democracy in which governmental power ema-
nated from the people, who in the form of a written constitution manifested
their belief in the supremacy of constitutional principles and delegated to the
judiciary the ultimate responsibility for their interpretation and applica-
tion.256
Moreover, Sutherland recognized a fundamental distinction between
making law and interpreting it. In response to the transient interests of their
constituents, legislators enacted laws for political expediency. Judges, how-
ever, had no constituents.25 Through reason and logic, judges interpreted
laws and resolved disputes upon the basis of public policy intended to en-
sure the equal operation of the laws.258 As Sutherland explained:
25 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 391.
252 See id. at 384; see also Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 5.
s See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 5.
4 George Sutherland, Undated Speech on Utah Judiciary 4, 18 (transcript available
in the Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Utah Judiciary
Speech]. In this regard, Sutherland remarked that the recall of judges and judicial deci-
sions "advocate[s] a method by which the rights of the minority shall be subordinate to
the will of those who for the time being predominate in numbers." Sutherland, What
Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 3; see also Sutherland, The Law
and the People, supra note 177, at 7.
25 See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 388.
2"6 See id. at 377-78; Utah State Bar Association Address, supra note 233, at 64-66;
Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 381; Sutherland, The
Law and the People, supra note 177, at 4-5.
"' See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 379; Utah
Judiciary Speech, supra note 254, at 10; Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra
note 177, at 5; Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225,
at 3; 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2801 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
258 See Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, supra note 166, at 204-
05 ("The law must apply to all alike. The making of law is an exercise of the will of
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The judiciary stand upon wholly different ground. They
voice no policy; speak for no political party or faction and
discharge the behests of no majority. Their duty is simply to
declare and apply the law. In doing so it often becomes their
sworn and solemn duty to disregard the wishes and senti-
ments of a majority of the people and declare in favor of the
position of a single individual as against every other citizen
of the commonwealth 5 9
Free from the constraints of partisan politics, courts were more likely to
preserve individual rights and maintain constitutional principles. 2 °
From this perspective, Sutherland criticized Progressive Era proposals
that authorized legislative invalidation of unpopular judicial decisions and
the recall of judges. He feared these reforms would impair the integrity of
courts and compromise their role in the constitutional system. He decried
against attempts to ignore the distinctions between the judicial and legisla-
tive processes" and regarded all types of judicial recall as unfortunate ef-
forts "to make judges more responsible to popular opinion .... ,,2
In addition, recall threatened an independent judiciary necessary to pre-
serve individual rights through impartial construction of constitutional prin-
ciples designed to limit governmental authority.263 Without their indepen-
dence, Sutherland felt courts might decide cases on the basis of popular
whims and emotions and thus leave the rights of persons at "the mercy of
the transitory opinions of the changing majority."' Subject to the control
of political factions through the means of popular recall, the judiciary would
no longer restrain democratic majorities. Ultimately, in Sutherland's view,
this signified the unfortunate transformation of a government of laws to one
based upon the fickle desires of men. 65
the state; the interpretation and application of the law is an exercise of the reason of the
judge."); see also Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note
225, at 3; 47 CONG. REc. 2793, 2801 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
'9 Utah Judiciary Speech, supra note 254, at 4.
260 See id. at 18; see also Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 8.
261 See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 5.
262 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 379.
263 See 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2800-02 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland);
Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 5; Sutherland, What Shall We
Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 3-4.
264 Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 384; Sutherland,
The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 7.
265 See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 375, 382.
Sutherland worried that a mixture of judicial and legislative authority would foster class
legislation. See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 7-8.
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Sutherland considered the judiciary most able to resolve constitutional
and legal issues with deliberate care and long-range perspective. Trained in
the common law, with its respect for precedent, its emphasis upon gradual
change, and its appreciation of historical custom, most judges were unlikely
to make radical or impulsive decisions.'" Sutherland favored application
of the common law to new conditions but also understood the importance of
departing from it where dogmatic adherence to precedent would be fool-
ish. 267
Nevertheless, it was Sutherland's fealty to common law principles and
abiding respect for historical tradition that ultimately led Sutherland to de-
fend the increasingly untenable police powers jurisprudence of the Lochner
era. Indeed, Sutherland's enduring legacy may be that, as a Supreme Court
Justice, his commitment to seemingly neutral concepts of judicial review
blinded him to the realities of industrial society.
III. JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Between 1922 and 1937, George Sutherland articulated a jurisprudence
of economic liberty that revealed his inherent distrust of democratic majori-
ties and his aversion to political factions. To the extent that he set forth
limitations upon governmental authority to regulate private economic affairs,
his views reflected those of a conservative tradition in which the common
law and historical custom, rather than laissez-faire political economy or
Social Darwinism, guided judicial decision making. 2 Moreover, an abid-
ing respect for the equal operation of the law and an acute awareness of the
foibles of political expediency molded Sutherland's conception of the public
welfare. Although on occasion his opinions invoked the rhetoric of natural
rights or lauded the merits of individualism, as a jurist he preferred to rely
upon the steady progress of the common law and historical experience in his
analysis of governmental powers. For nearly a decade, Sutherland's views
were those of a majority of the Justices; thereafter, the composition of the
Court changed and Sutherland became the principal guardian of a crumbling
judicial tradition.269 Insofar as Sutherland's dissents recapitulated his fun-
See Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 4-5; 44 CONG. REC.
2080, 2096 (1909) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (discussing the importance of stare
decisis); see also 47 id. at 2793, 2803 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland) (expressing
enthusiasm for the common law as an instrument of gradual change); Sutherland, The
Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 385 (discussing the importance of histo-
ry and precedent in the judicial process).
267 See Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 386.
26 See supra notes 122-50 and accompanying text.
On September 5, 1922, George Sutherland joined the United States Supreme
Court, replacing the retired John H. Clarke. William Howard Taft, appointed in 1921,
was the Chief Justice. The other members of the Court were Louis D. Brandeis, Wil-
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damental ideas, they also underscored his emphasis upon the significance of
judicial review and the vulnerability of private rights in a democratic repub-
lic.
A. The Problem of Factions
In large part, Sutherland's aversion to political factions comprised the
principal component of his jurisprudence of economic liberty. For
Sutherland, like many jurists before him, class legislation threatened the
public welfare. From this perspective, he assessed labor regulations, debtor
relief measures, and state laws that fixed prices or restricted competition in
the marketplace.
These cases also involved freedom of contract, a doctrinal staple of
substantive due process for years before Sutherland joined the Supreme
Court and the catalyst for some of the Court's most troublesome disputes
during his tenure. While Sutherland did not believe in absolute contractual
freedom,"' he recognized liberty of contract as an important personal right
protected from factions by constitutional limitations upon state police pow-
ers. Disagreement about the nature of these restrictions and the role of the
judiciary in their interpretation marked the transformation of economic sub-
stantive due process during the 1930s. Sutherland and his more conservative
colleagues on the Court insisted that state regulation of private economic
affairs bear a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or
welfare. In contrast, other justices, more deferential toward legislative ma-
liam R. Day, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Joseph McKenna, James McReynolds, Mahlon
Pitney, and Willis Van Devanter. In 1923, Pierce Butler replaced Justice Day, and Ed-
ward T. Sanford succeeded Justice Pitney on the Court. In 1925, Harlan F. Stone re-
placed Justice McKenna. Taft, Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter often
voted as a conservative bloc in economic regulation cases, although, on occasion, Taft
broke from the pack. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923)
(Taft, C.J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone were far more tolerant of
local economic regulation. See, e.g., Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Brandeis, J., joining); id. at 447 (Stone, J., dissenting)
(Brandeis, J., joining).
In 1930, Charles Evans Hughes succeeded William Howard Taft as Chief Justice,
and Owen J. Roberts assumed Justice Sanford's seat on the Court. Holmes retired in
1932, and Benjamin N. Cardozo took his place on the Court. Toward the end of his
Court tenure, Sutherland, together with Justices Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter,
often comprised a minority in economic regulation cases.
2 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546.
There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to
a great variety of restraints. But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general
rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge
it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.
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jorities, endorsed expansive notions of public welfare and ultimately rejected
the rigid categorical assessment of local police powers in favor of a prag-
matic balance between private rights and public power.
1. Private Contracts and Local Police Powers
Local regulation of private contracts afforded Sutherland, as a Supreme
Court Justice, ample opportunity to rely upon the concepts of democracy,
law, and judicial review that he had held throughout his public career. In-
deed, his approach toward employment contracts underscored his factional
aversion and skepticism about the democratic process. Sutherland regarded
laws that directly restricted the freedom of parties to negotiate wages as
illegitimate class legislation that benefited one group at the expense of an-
other and that created arbitrary distinctions unsubstantially related to public
health, safety, morals, or welfare. Conversely, he found permissible laws
that regulated methods of payment or the conditions of labor.27'
Sutherland initially set forth his views in Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal,272 the first Supreme Court case to address the constitutionality of a
minimum wage for women. In Adkins, one of the plaintiffs was Willie Ly-
ons, a young woman discharged from her employment as a hotel elevator
operator when the hotel sought to avoid criminal liability for paying her a
wage less than that prescribed by a local administrative board.273 Enacted
271 See id. at 547-48. Sutherland explained that laws regulating methods of payment
were constitutional because they prevented fraudulent and inequitable employer prac-
tices and left both the employers and employees free to negotiate the amount of wages.
See id. at 547, 554; e.g., McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909) (upholding a law
that mandated pre-screening weighing of coal to determine the coal miners' wages).
Sutherland also thought the government could limit hours of labor in dangerous occupa-
tions, such as mining, but questioned the constitutionality of a blanket restriction on the
number of hours workers toiled in all occupations. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 548. As a
Utah legislator, Sutherland had supported the maximum hours law upheld in Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
2' The District of Columbia Minimum Wage Law Act of Sept. 19, 1918, ch. 174, 40
Stat. 960 (amended 1966), authorized a local administrative board to investigate wage
levels for women and children employed in any occupation in Washington, D.C. See id.
§ 8(1). It empowered the board to set minimum wages for women and children nec-
essary to "maintain them in good health and to protect their morals . . . ." Id. § 9, quot-
ed in Adkins, 261 U.S. at 540. An employer who paid a female or child employee be-
low the minimum wage committed a misdemeanor under the Act and was subject to a
fine and prison. See ch. 174, § 18, 40 Stat. at 960.
Adkins actually involved two consolidated cases, one brought by a children's hospi-
tal that employed some, but not all, women below the assigned minimum wage, and
one brought by Willie Lyons, age twenty-one, an elevator operator "employed by the
Congress Hall Hotel Company ... at a salary of $35 per month and two meals a day."
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expressly to promote the health and moral welfare of women employed
within the District of Columbia,274 the law relied, in part, upon a series of
post-Lochner decisions that sustained maximum hour regulations for indus-
trial workers.7 Felix Frankfurter, counsel for the District of Columbia
Minimum Wage Board, who previously had convinced the Court that regu-
lation of an employee's hours was well within a state's legitimate police
powers, argued that the minimum wage law similarly advanced the public
interest in preserving the health and welfare of women.276
A divided Court rejected this premise and invalidated the District of
Columbia minimum wage law as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
and property under the Due Process Clause. Writing for the majority,
Sutherland ruled that the law was an arbitrary and unreasonable infringe-
ment upon freedom of contract. 77 He presumed that parties to an employ-
ment contract bargained from relatively equal positions, which the minimum
wage law undermined when it restricted the freedom of women to negotiate
for their own wages and compelled employers to pay them a fixed sum.278
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542. The hotel discharged her rather than pay her the higher wage
prescribed by the board. See id.
274 See ch. 174, § 23, 40 Stat. at 960.
275 See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding the Adamson Act's
temporary post-World War I regulation of interstate rail employees' hours and wages in
a business affected with a public interest); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917)
(sustaining a law regulating the hours of workers in mills, mines, and factories, regard-
less of gender, and not even mentioning Lochner v. New York); Bosley v. McLaughlin,
236 U.S. 385 (1915) (sustaining a law regulating the hours of female hospital workers);
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (sustaining a law restricting the number of hours
women could work in hotels); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (sustaining
a law that regulated factory workers' hours); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(upholding a law prohibiting women from working more than ten hours daily in a facto-
ry or laundry). Before Lochner, the Court sustained as a reasonable exercise of police
powers a Utah law that set maximum hours for laborers in mines, smelters, and facto-
ries, which the Court recognized as inherently dangerous occupations. See Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391-93, 395 (1898). Moreover, the Court noted that the inherent
bargaining disparity between employers and employees in these dangerous jobs often
prevented employees from negotiating for improved working conditions. See id. at 397.
Lochner and other cases ignored this bargaining disparity.
276 In Bunting, Frankfurter successfully argued that an Oregon maximum hours law
for mill and factory laborers promoted public health, safety, and welfare. See Bunting,
243 U.S. at 431-33 (argument of Felix Frankfurter, co-counsel for Defendant in Error).
In Adkins, Frankfurter argued that the District of Columbia wage regulation substantial-
ly advanced the health and morals of women, who, because of disparities in the bar-
gaining process, were thought less able than men to afford adequate food, shelter, and
medical care without a standard living wage. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 527-35 (argument
of Felix Frankfurter, co-counsel for Appellants).
277 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545, 555-62.
278 See id. at 545 ("[T]he parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the
[Vol. 6:1
JUSTICE GEORGE SUTHERLAND AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
As a staunch advocate of equal opportunity and a longstanding supporter
of women's suffrage, Sutherland believed that regulation of women's wages
was unnecessary given the recent passage of a constitutional amendment that
gave women the franchise.'7 Sutherland assumed, perhaps naively, that
women no longer required special legislative treatment. He thought that
women, capable of voting and of exerting their own political and civic influ-
ence, should be as able as men to enter into employment contracts of their
own free will.2" Accordingly, he suggested that the minimum wage law
operated unequally in that it restricted the contractual liberty of one set of
potential employees, women, but left men alone."' In this regard,
Sutherland wryly observed that "[n]o distinction can be made between wom-
en ... and men, for, certainly, if women require a minimum wage to pre-
serve their morals men require it to preserve their honesty."' 2
Essentially, Sutherland construed the minimum wage provision as illegit-
imate class legislation for several reasons. First, differential treatment of
workers upon the basis of gender hampered the economic freedom of wom-
en like Willie Lyons, who, but for the imposition of a standard wage, would
have continued in jobs they enjoyed at compensation they considered
fair. 3 Moreover, the minimum wage law, with its broad assumptions
about income and public welfare, disregarded the individual circumstances
of employers and employees alike.' It created involuntary burdens for
employers and disproportionate benefits for their employees. As Sutherland
explained:
best terms they can as the result of private bargaining."); see also id. at 554-55, 557.
" See id. at 553. Sutherland referred to the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920,
which provides, in relevant part: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1. For Sutherland's earlier support of women's suffrage, see 51
CONG. REC. 3598-3601 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); 53 id. 11,318 (1916)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland); id. at 75 (1915) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
28 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553.
281 See id. at 553-54. Sutherland explained the law was "simply and exclusively a
price-fixing law, confined to adult women (for we are not now considering the provi-
sions relating to minors), who are legally as capable of. contracting for themselves as
men." Id. at 554.
282 Id. at 556.
" At trial, Willie Lyons apparently testified that her wages "were the best she was
able to obtain for any work she was capable of performing .... ." Id. at 542. She also
claimed, in Sutherland's words, "that she could not secure any other position at which
she could make a living, with as good physical and moral surroundings, and earn as
good wages, and that she was desirous of continuing and would continue the employ-
ment but for the order of the board." Id. at 542-43.
' See id. at 557.
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The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to
the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by
compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only
whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespec-
tive of the ability of his business to sustain the bur-
den .... "
In particular, Sutherland found objectionable the employer's obligation
to pay a set wage regardless of the actual value of the labor provided or the
changing conditions of the business.' Not only did this curtail the
employer's economic liberty, it also made the employer assume a collateral
duty "to insure [the] subsistence, health and morals" of workers."
Sutherland regarded the imposition of a minimum wage with considerable
skepticism, uncertain that it promoted the health of women and unconvinced
that a substandard wage adversely affected public welfare.' He doubted
that an employer who paid fair value for an employee's service either
caused the indigence of that employee or contributed to it, and so regarded
the Washington, D.C. law as "the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of
77289power ....
Sutherland further explained his intense opposition to minimum wage
legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2' in which he dissented
' Id. Sutherland also noted that the law prevented employers "from adjusting com-
pensation to the differing merits of ... employees." Id. Moreover, he considered the
law overinclusive because it applied to both employers with a distinct advantage when
bargaining with employees and to "those whose bargaining power may be as weak as
that of the employee." Id.
286 See id. at 555-58. "The moral requirement implicit in every contract of employ-
ment, viz, that the amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each
other some relation of just equivalence, is completely ignored." Id. at 558.
287 Id.
28" As Sutherland noted:
[T]he sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered [and] amounts to
a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent
person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and
therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs
to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.
Id. at 557-58.
289 Id. at 558-59. Sutherland also feared that if a minimum wage was permissible, the
government could, at some other time, impose a maximum wage. See id. at 560. This
demonstrated the law's arbitrary nature. In 1916, Sutherland expressed similar concern
to labor leader Samuel Gompers: "[l]f we once undertook by legislation to fix wages,
they may be at first fixed at a high sum, but under this concession they may sometimes
be fixed at a very inadequate sum." Letter to Samuel Gompers, supra note 167, at 2.
2- 300 U.S. 379, 400-14 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Between Adkins and
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from the Court's decision to overrule Adkins and sustain a Washington state
minimum wage law for women. In support of his contention, Sutherland ex-
plained that a fundamental difference existed between maximum hours and
minimum wage laws. Unlike regulations of labor that left contractual parties
free to negotiate the value of services provided, minimum wage laws im-
paired the liberty and property rights of both employers and employees.29'
Moreover, a law that prohibited the employment of women below a standard
wage conferred a competitive advantage upon men, whom employers could
hire for the same jobs at lower wages.292
Nevertheless, Sutherland understood that under some circumstances the
government could intervene in the relationship between employees and em-
ployers without infringing upon contractual liberty.293 In large part, his
West Coast Hotel, Sutherland joined three Court opinions that invalidated minimum
wage laws for women. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell,
269 U.S. 530 (1925).
291 See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554. Sutherland believed, however, that an emergency might war-
rant a temporary wage regulation. See id. Moreover, he suggested that a business affect-
ed with a public interest also might have the wages of its employees regulated. See id.
at 546. He thought neither situation existed in Adkins nor West Coast Hotel.
292 See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland also
said: "Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction applica-
ble to the wage contracts of all working women from which like contracts of all work-
ing men are left free .... The ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows, does
not depend upon sex." Id. at 413 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
A majority of the Court remained unpersuaded by Sutherland's semantical distinc-
tions and, in overruling Adkins, adopted a more tolerant approach toward local police
powers that expressed the public interest in providing women with adequate wages.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes refused to distinguish between a state's
power, previously upheld, to regulate the hours of labor, and minimum wage regula-
tions. See id. at 391-97. Accordingly, the Court re-examined Adkins in light of "the eco-
nomic conditions which have supervened . . . ." Id. at 390. Unlike Sutherland, Hughes
recognized the public interest in providing women with a decent wage to preserve their
health. See id. at 398-99. He noted that "women ... are in the class receiving the least
pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims
of those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances." Id. at 398. For
this reason, the state could enact a minimum wage law. See id. at 398-99. In response
to Sutherland's factional concerns, Hughes even noted that the absence of a minimum
wage law for women exacerbated their exploitation and unequal bargaining position,
hindered their health and welfare, and burdened the public that must support them. See
id. at 399. "The community [as a whole] is not bound to provide what is in effect a
subsidy for unconscionable employers." Id. The employers' unwillingness to pay a
minimum wage manifested "their selfish disregard of the public interest." Id. at 400.
293 Writing to labor leader Samuel Gompers, Sutherland revealed his relatively pro-
gressive views about working conditions:
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willingness to sustain regulations of the number of hours employees worked
reflected his notion that this type of legislation was impartial and inured to
the benefit of the community. For example, in Radice v. New York,294
Sutherland found constitutional a law that prohibited women from working
in restaurants between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. In contrast to his approach
in minimum wage cases, Sutherland perceived that physiological differences
between the sexes warranted protective laws of this kind designed to pro-
mote the health and welfare of women.295 Although the law was aimed on-
ly at women, Sutherland noted with approval that it applied equally to all
female employees.296
Sutherland's conception of police powers reflected his fundamental aver-
sion to factions. Like conservative jurists before him, he believed that the
reasonable exercise of police powers required a substantial relationship be-
tween economic regulation and public health, safety, morals, or welfare.'
I have always favored laws which had for their object the substantive betterment
of the workers, such as those which enforce proper sanitary conditions, safety
appliances and machinery, adequate. . . compensation for injuries, and so on. I
[also favor], by legislation the eight-hour day in industries such as mining, smelt-
ing and other industries where long employment is injurious to health .... I am
in favor of an eight-hour day in all the mechanical industries and in all work
where the same set of muscles are continuously employed, or where the same
strain and attention is continuously required about the work.
Letter from George Sutherland to Samuel Gompers, supra note 167, at 1-2.
294 264 U.S. 292 (1924). The law exempted female entertainers, cloakroom and parlor
attendants, hotel dining room employees, and some cafeteria workers. See 1917 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 535, at 1564. The state enacted this law to prevent women from endangering
their health through late night work. See Radice, 264 U.S. at 294.
295 See Radice, 264 U.S. at 295 (distinguishing Adkins). However, in the context of
minimum wage legislation, Sutherland rejected the relevance of physiological differenc-
es between men and women. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S.
at 413 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
2. See Radice, 264 U.S. at 296. Sutherland explained: "The statute does not present
a case where some persons of a class are selected for special restraint from which oth-
ers of the same class are left free, but a case where all in the same class of work, are
included in the restraint." Id. (citation omitted).
297 See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928) (holding that the
state exercises its police powers reasonably "only when such legislation bears a real and
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or some other phase of the gen-
eral welfare.") In Liggett, the Court, in an opinion written by Sutherland, invalidated a
1927 Pennsylvania law that prohibited prospective ownership of pharmacies within the
state by pharmaceutical corporations in which not all of the shareholders were licensed
pharmacists. Ostensibly, this law meant to promote public health and safety. The Court
ruled it an unconstitutional "restriction upon private business." Id. at 113. It reasoned
that "mere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can
have no real or substantial relation to the public health . . ." Id. Unlike other state
laws regulating prescriptions and the conduct of pharmacies that advanced public health,
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Invariably, he assessed the scope of police powers in the context of whether
governmental action was impartial.29 While Sutherland realized that legis-
lative classifications often produce unequal effects, he only objected to arbi-
trary public intervention in private economic affairs.2 Laws for the bene-
fit of one group at the expense of another were illegitimate precisely be-
cause their unequal operation threatened, rather than advanced, the public
welfare. From this perspective, he considered workmen's compensation
permissible and supported maximum hours laws, yet found minimum wage
regulations unreasonable.'
Undeterred by the shift in the Supreme Court's police powers jurispru-
dence toward the end of the 1930s, Sutherland persisted in his categorical
approach. Whereas Chief Justice Hughes and a slim majority of the Justices
began to assess the scope of police powers by balancing the public interest
against private rights,3"' Sutherland refused to abandon the traditional re-
quirement that local economic regulation bear a substantial relationship to
public health, safety, morals, or welfare. It was on this basis that he dissent-
ed in West Coast Hotel, wherein he suggested that a minimum wage law for
women was arbitrary and unrelated to the legitimate exercise of police pow-
ers.
3 oM
Protection of private contract rights from the turbulent whims of demo-
cratic majorities was, for Sutherland, most consistent with the public wel-
fare. As he explained in Adkins:
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by
the Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but
to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot
be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary
restraint of the liberties of its constituent members.0 3
this measure was an arbitrary restraint upon private business. See id. at 112-13.
298 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932) (noting that
reasonable police powers are those "applied with appropriate impartiality").
299 See, e.g., Radice, 264 U.S. at 296.
For cases in which Sutherland wrote majority opinions sustaining state workmen's
compensation laws, see Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928), and Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923). For Sutherland's distinction between
maximum hours laws and minimum wage regulations, see Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553-54,
and West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 407 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
301 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391-92, 398-400; Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-35,
437, 442-44 (1934).
302 See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 407-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting)..
3 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561.
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Sutherland thus was reluctant to balance private economic rights with the
public interest in determining the reasonableness of local police powers.
Political expediency and the self-interest of factions who manipulated the
democratic process made him regard even the most well-meaning legislation
with suspicion. He doubted claims of public imperative as the basis for
governmental authority because he feared that they emanated from factional
objectives inconsistent with the long-term interests of the community.'
Sutherland's dissent in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdel 5
demonstrated his willingness to invoke the primacy of constitutional limita-
tions as the safeguard against partial laws that restricted contractual liberty
and redistributed property. In Blaisdell, he argued that the Contract Clause
prohibited a state from using its police powers to impair a mortgagor's con-
tractual obligation.' At the height of the Depression, Minnesota, in re-
sponse to intense pressure from mortgagors, enacted a law that extended the
period of redemption "from mortgage foreclosure and execution sales."3"
As applied to a pre-existing contract between two mortgagors and the finan-
cial institution that held their mortgage, the law permitted the mortgagors to
retain possession of foreclosed property for up to two years during the De-
pression upon the payment of a reasonable rent.3"8 This controverted the
See, e.g., Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 471-73 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (contending
that a mortgage moratorium enacted for the temporary benefit of Depression mortgagors
impaired the contract rights of mortgagees in contravention of the Contract Clause and
jeopardized the stability of contracts); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
278-80 (1932) (rejecting as illegitimate partial legislation an Oklahoma law that restrict-
ed competition in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice).
305 290 U.S. 398, 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
306 See id. at 473, 479-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Contract
Clause was an absolute prohibition against state laws that impaired the obligation of
contracts).
307 Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act, ch. 339, preamble, 1933 Minn. Laws 514-
15. For a discussion of the law's Depression context, see Samuel R. Olken, Charles
Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of Contract Clause Juris-
prudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 569-70 (1993).
308 The law declared an economic emergency and authorized mortgagors of fore-
closed property sold at public auction to request from a district court an extension of
the redemption period for up to two years. To retain possession of foreclosed property,
a mortgagor would have to pay its reasonable rental value throughout the redemption
period.
In 1928, the Blaisdells executed a mortgage on their Minnesota boarding house in
exchange for a $3,800 loan from Home Building & Loan Association. As mortgagee,
the lender had a right to foreclose upon the property if the Blaisdells, as mortgagors,
defaulted. A 1927 law only gave mortgagors a year to redeem foreclosed property sold
at public auction. See MINN. STAT. § 9608 (1927). In May 1932, the Blaisdells default-
ed, and under the law in effect when the parties formed the mortgage contract, Home
Building & Loan Association would have obtained complete title to the realty in May
1933. Before this time, however, under the new law the Blaisdells applied to a local
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foreclosure provisions of the mortgage contract and, in Sutherland's view,
impaired the contract rights of the mortgagee.' A majority of the Court
sustained the constitutionality of the mortgage moratorium and recogiized
that the public interest in private contracts permitted Minnesota to adjust
temporarily contractual rights and duties during an economic emergency."'
In contrast, Sutherland interpreted the Contract Clause literally, found no
exception for emergencies, and concluded that the state had exceeded the
permissible scope of its police powers.3" He characterized "the attempt by
legislative devices to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of
the creditor" as impermissible class legislation." 2
2. Access to Business and the Rights to Property
While a Supreme Court Justice, Sutherland confronted a number of
regulations that restricted the liberty of businesses to compete in the market
as well as others that attempted to fix the prices for services and commodi-
ties."1 As in his approach toward economic regulation of private contracts,
Sutherland analyzed these issues from an anti-factional perspective.
court for equitable relief. The court initially dismissed their petition but eventually ex-
tended the period of redemption to May 1935 after the Blaisdells appealed successfully
to the state's highest court. See Olken, supra note 307, at 573-75.
See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 480-83 (Sutherland, J.,'dissenting),
310 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434-48. The Court eschewed a rigid construction of the
Contract Clause in favor of one that reconciled private contract rights with the collec-
tive interest in economic order. See id. at 442-44. Five of the Justices ruled that the law
was a reasonable exercise of state police powers that prevented "the impending ruin" of
both mortgagors and mortgagees during a period of unprecedented economic turmoil.
Id. at 446. The law's temporary duration and preservation of the underlying indebted-
ness meant it did not impair the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Con-
tract Clause. See id. at 440, 444-47. In response to Sutherland's factional concerns,
Chief Justice Hughes noted "that the question is no longer merely that of one party to a
contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the eco-
nomic structure upon which the good of all depends." Id. at 442.
311 See id. at 473 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland believed the mortgage mora-
torium impaired the obligation of contracts because it delayed the mortgagee's complete
possession of the foreclosed property. See id. at 480-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
313 See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (Sutherland, J.)
(invalidating a Tennessee law fixing gas prices); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a New Jersey law that fixed fees charged by em-
ployment agencies), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941); Tyson
and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a New York
law that fixed resale prices of entertainment tickets).
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In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,314 Sutherland wrote- an opinion that
upheld the right of an ice company to operate in a city without first demon-
strating its public necessity and securing a license required by law.3"5 For
Sutherland, this prerequisite signified a restriction imposed by the legislature
to stifle competition in favor of an established business.316 The manufac-
ture, sale and distribution of ice, while important to the community, still
comprised an "ordinary business," and therefore did not warrant special
regulation. 1  Accordingly, the law arbitrarily infringed upon Liebmann's
freedom to pursue economic opportunity in the ice business, and its provi-
sions were unreasonable in their tenuous connection to the public good.318
In this respect, Sutherland's rationale reflected that of Chief Justice Taney
nearly a century earlier in the Charles River Bridge case when he suggested
that special laws protecting monopolies were detrimental to the public wel-
fare.319
314 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
315 A 1925 act proclaimed that the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice was a
public business, and prohibited the undertaking of these activities without a license. The
issuance of a license depended upon showing proof of necessity for a new ice business
in the affected community. Under the act, where existing ice facilities adequately met
the public needs, the ice commission could deny a license to any applicant. See id. at
271-72 (describing 1925 Ice Law, 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws 147). New State Ice Compa-
ny, which had a license to manufacture, sell, and distribute ice within Oklahoma City,
invoked the act to restrain Liebmann, who did not have a license, from operating his ice
business in the same area. Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland rejected the premise
that the ice business was one sufficiently affected with a public interest to warrant the
regulation of competition. See id. at 277-79. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the ice
law unconstitutionally restricted Liebmann's freedom of contract. See id. at 280.
316 See id. at 278-79. Sutherland noted that "Itlhe control here asserted does not
protect against monopoly, but tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competi-
tion, but to prevent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from engag-
ing in it." Id. at 279.
"'1 Id. at 277-80. In essence, Sutherland believed that the law infringed upon the right
to pursue an otherwise lawful occupation. The law reflected factional bias because it did
not similarly restrict other ordinary businesses (e.g., groceries, shoemakers, etc.). See id.
Sutherland's opinion recalls Justice Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases. See
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 109-110 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
318 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 277-80. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis ex-
plained that the license requirement advanced the public interest in preventing waste
created by the unnecessary duplication of services and producers in the ice business.
See id. at 282, 292 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis believed that supplying ice was
tantamount to a public utility and thus was a business affected with a public interest
that necessitated regulation of this kind to ensure that Oklahoma residents received an
adequate and dependable supply of ice for their hygienic and food needs. See id. at 290-
91, 300-05 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
319 See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 452-53 (1837).
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Insofar as Sutherland conceded the authority of the states to regulate
businesses concerning matters of public health or safety, or concerning utili-
ties upon which the community relied, he insisted that the exercise of police
powers be in a direct and impartial manner."' Moreover, Sutherland re-
fused to permit the guise of local experimentation to sanctify what was
otherwise impermissible class legislation.321 Thus, he could recognize the
public interest in cotton gins, yet still strike down as unconstitutional a law
that made it harder for some types of entities to obtain a cotton gin li-
cense.3" Similarly, he ruled that California could not restrict access to its
public highways through a licensing scheme that conferred a competitive
benefit upon common carriers at the expense of private businesses." In a
third case, Sutherland believed New York was well within its power to man-
date that all motor vehicles for hire obtain liability insurance or post bonds
because the regulation equally affected all such carriers and benefited the
entire public.3U
Sutherland on occasion realized that seemingly partial laws actually
advanced the public interest in health, safety, or morals. His zoning deci-
sions exemplify his willingness to restrict the uses of private property of
some groups for the benefit of the community. For example, in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,"' Sutherland rejected the argument by a real estate
developer's counsel that a comprehensive zoning plan diverted the profitable
use of property from one set of property owners to others.3" Instead,
• See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 279-80; see also Liggett v. Baldridge, 278
U.S. 105, 111-14 (1928).
321 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 279-80. In contrast, Justice Brandeis perceived
the importance for the state "to remould, through experimentation,... economic prac-
tices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs." Id. at 311
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Much more deferential toward the local legislature than
Sutherland, Brandeis implicitly accepted the legislature's conclusion that regulated com-
petition in the ice business was necessary to promote the more efficient manufacture,
sale, and distribution of ice. See id. at 284-86, 291-94, 300-05 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 See Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 520-25 (1929) (invalidating an
Oklahoma law exempting agricultural and horticultural cooperatives from demonstrating
public necessity as a prerequisite for obtaining a cotton gin license, but requiring other
businesses to obtain such a license). Sutherland explained that the law "produces a
classification which subjects one to the burden of showing a public necessity for his
business, from which it relieves the other, and is essentially arbitrary" because it does
not promote the public welfare. Id. at 524-25.
31 See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (inval-
idating the application of a highway certificate of convenience regulation to private
automobiles for hire).
31 See Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 143-45 (1924) (sustaining a New York
liability insurance/bond requirement for hired motor vehicles as a reasonable exercise of
local police powers that promoted public safety).
3- 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31 See id. at 371 (argument of Newton D. Baker, co-counsel for Appellee). Ambler
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Sutherland found that limiting a section of the village to residential use sub-
stantially advanced public health and safety by reducing the likelihood of
neighborhood accidents and improving the quality of life.3" Sutherland ac-
cepted the premise that changes in demographic growth necessitated some
restriction upon private land use3" and noted that the zoning ordinance did
not distinguish arbitrarily between different types of industrial activity."'
For this reason, the zoning ordinance functioned as a law of equal operation,
protecting the town's interest in preserving the quiet use and enjoyment of
residential property.3"
Realty Company alleged the zoning ordinance impaired its liberty and property interests
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it reduced substantially the industrial
value of land the developer hoped to sell in the future by restricting the land to a less
profitable residential use. The company claimed the ordinance was impermissible class
legislation born of the financial self-interest of homeowners and only involved ephemer-
al matters of aesthetic taste that did not implicate legitimate police power concerns. See
id. at 373-76. Sutherland sustained the Euclid ordinance "in its general scope," id. at
397 (Sutherland, J.), refusing to speculate about its specific provisions in the absence of
any actual or imminent injury to the complainant. See id. at 395-97.
327 See id. at 391-94.
31 See id. at 392; see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-10 (1927) (Sutherland,
J.) (sustaining, in reference to changing demographic conditions, a Roanoke, Virginia
set-back ordinance as a reasonable exercise of local police powers); Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) (Sutherland, J.) (sustaining a Los Angeles law prohib-
iting commercial buildings in a residential area). But see Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a Cambridge, Massachusetts zoning
ordinance that did not advance a legitimate police powers interest when it prevented an
owner from using his entire property for industrial use).
329 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-89. At first, Sutherland thought the law was unconsti-
tutional, but after some persuasion by Justice Stone and others, Sutherland requested
reargument of the case and eventually decided to sustain the ordinance as a reasonable
exercise of local police powers. See Alfred McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections,
46 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 712 (1946).
330 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-90. For the implication that laissez-faire economics
did not influence Sutherland's decision, see SIEGAN, supra note 40, at 153 (arguing that
Sutherland "did not believe economic freedom was desirable in the landuse market").
Siegan contends this reason, not a calculated effort to protect the economic interests of
wealthy homeowners, best explains the ruling. See id. Herbert Hovenkamp argues the
opinion really applied the economic doctrine of externalities, an early twentieth century
exception to classical economic theory (laissez-faire economics) that allowed limited
governmental intervention into market relations on behalf of affected third parties not
part of the normal bargaining process. See Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note
8, at 441-46. Both arguments, however, seemingly overlook Sutherland's aversion to-
ward factions and his reliance upon historical custom and the common law. Indeed,
Sutherland perceived Euclid, in large part, as a nuisance case. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at
387-88.
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3. Economic Liberty as a Constitutional Paradigm
In essence, Sutherland interpreted issues arising from the regulation of
private economic affairs as questions of power best resolved through histori-
cal and legal analysis. Rather than attempt to read a particular economic
order into the Constitution or imbue his interpretation of its limitations with
notions of Social Darwinism, Sutherland applied longstanding concepts of
anti-factional jurisprudence that had less to do with socio-economic theory
than with the common law and traditional ideals about equality. The eco-
nomic ramifications of his anti-factional approach should not be confused
with the judicial intent of Sutherland or other conservative jurists before
him.
Sutherland's support of workmen's compensation, regulation of the
hours and conditions of labor, and comprehensive zoning controverts the
often-held notion that his jurisprudence was motivated and influenced pri-
marily by laissez-faire political economy.33" ' Undoubtedly aware of the ex-
tremist views of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, Sutherland,
like his early mentor Thomas Cooley and 6ther Lochner era jurists, empha-
sized equal opportunity and individual liberty as integral to the public wel-
fare, while recognizing and appreciating the need for impartial governmental
action."' Moreover, early in his public career, Sutherland had explicitly
rejected the premise that the law of supply and demand prevented the gov-
ernment from intervening in a market economy to improve the conditions of
labor.333
33, See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 437, 445; Kens, supra
note 8, at 96-98; PASCHAL, SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 10;
Strong, supra note 8, at 438-39, 444-49, 452.
332 See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885) (Field, J.) (sustaining as
a reasonable exercise of state police powers a prohibition against washing and ironing
in public laundries late at night). Justice Field remarked, "Class legislation, discriminat-
ing against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying
out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation, it
affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment." Id. at 32 (re-
ferring to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process); see also Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 389-93 (discussing equal operation of the law); id. at
572-97 (discussing the importance of the impartial exercise of governmental authority to
preserve public health, safety, morals, and welfare).
133 See Sutherland, Economic Value and Social Justice, supra note 161, at 11. Thom-
as Cooley also rejected the use of laissez-faire economics as the principal means of
resolving legal issues arising out of employment relationships, noting that "it is easy
with a wave of the hand to refer them to the great law of demand and supply, but they
return to plague us again and again." Thomas Cooley, VI LECTURES ON CITY GOVERN-
MENT 52 (1879), quoted in Jones, supra note 12, at 768.
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Rarely did Sutherland mention economic theory in his judicial opin-
ions." Although in a few of his private writings and public speeches
Sutherland suggested that in price fixing and related areas government inter-
vention made little economic sense, he was careful to explain that his prima-
ry concern was with the shortcomings of the legislative process. He thus
once referred to the "folly of attempting to control the movement of prices
of ordinary commodities by legislation. Not only is any such attempt futile
from a practical view point, but it constitutes a distinct departure from the
great political principle . . . .""' In the same speech, Sutherland then noted
that "[t]he course of safety for society, as well as liberty for the individual,
is to make and enforce laws which will keep free the gates of equal oppor-
tunity to all .... ""'
For Sutherland and other members of the conservative judicial tradition,
constitutional limitations upon the scope of local police powers existed not
to protect an economic elite but rather to preserve the rights of individuals,
whenever possible, from the tyranny of the majority. 37
Throughout his public career, Sutherland did not view the mere posses-
sion of property or its accumulation in sacred terms.3" Instead, he per-
ceived it as an individual right representative of others especially vulnerable
in a democratic republic. From this perspective, he explained the importance
of constitutional limitations upon the arbitrary exercise of governmental
authority: "[F]or it is not the right of property which is protected, but the
right to property. Property, per se, has no rights; but the individual ... has
three great rights, equally sacred from arbitrary interference: the right to his
life, the right to his liberty, the right to his property." '339 Accordingly, he
believed freedom of contract was entitled to no less constitutional protection
than the First Amendment and other individual rights."
It was precisely because Sutherland understood economic liberty as a
constitutional paradigm that the principal source of his jurisprudence was an
One example is Sutherland's observation that a minimum wage law ignored the
actual value of services provided. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 558-
59 (1923).
... Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 17.
336 Id. at 19.
331 See Hovenkamp, Political Economy, supra note 8, at 386-90; Jones, supra note
12, at 755.
338 See Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 18. "I personally
entertain a very well settled opinion that society, including the very rich themselves,
would be greatly benefited if the few who have great wealth had less, and the vast
number who have very little had more." Id.
339 Id; see also Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 390
(arguing that the "right to property is of the same character as the right to life and lib-
erty").
340 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
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aversion to factions. Speculation about his economic motives ignores the
context of his constitutional analysis and obscures his reliance upon com-
mon law and historical custom.
B. Common Law Principles and Historical Custom
Common law principles and historical custom, rather than abstract socio-
economic theories, helped shape Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic
liberty. For many late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists, both the
common law and history were important sources of constitutional adjudica-
tion. The common law, with its emphasis upon gradual change and legal
precedent, enabled judges to interpret constitutional principles from a histor-
ical perspective." Aversion to political factions and skepticism of political
expediency were significant aspects of the historical tradition that influenced
Lochner era jurists. The common law afforded jurists a legal methodology
from which to apply anti-factional sentiment to the problems of economic
regulation. Historical custom perpetuated longstanding concerns about fac-
tions and provided the more conservative members of the judiciary with the
context from which to construe the constitutional limits of local police pow-
ers. Sutherland strongly identified with this tradition and drew upon the
common law and historical experience during his years on the Court.
Inherently wary of abrupt change, which he associated with the fleeting
whims of popular majorities, Sutherland reposed his trust in "the methodical
habits of the past."342 As a member of Congress he warned against "ca-
reering after novel and untried things" and urged caution. 43 Speaking be-
fore the Senate in 1911, he expressed a fondness for the common law and
history that later would mark his judicial career: "On the whole I entertain a
profound regard for notions which have long persisted, because, having
passed the scrutiny and survived the buffetings of time, they are more likely
"344to be right than wrong ....
Much of the economic legislation before the Supreme Court during
Sutherland's judicial career emanated from social and economic turmoil.
Government intervention in private economic affairs became more pervasive
at the behest of popular majorities eager to use the legislative process to
redress perceived inequities in what had become a somewhat harsh, highly
141 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 22, 59-60; Jones,
supra note 12, at 757-59; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1492-1515 (discussing
Cooley's constitutional jurisprudence); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1,
at 65-99 (discussing historism and common law).
342 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); Sutherland,
Principle or Expedient?, supra note 174, at 7.
343 47 CONG. REC. 2793, 2795 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
314 51 id. at 3598, 3600 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
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interdependent economy in which relatively few enjoyed significant econom-
ic freedom. Although during the 1920s and 1930s the Supreme Court sus-
tained many local economic regulations before it, Sutherland and his more
conservative colleagues on the Court voted to invalidate measures that they
considered inconsistent with prior common law principles and factional con-
cerns.
1. Common Law Methodology
Sutherland often applied the common law in a literal manner that under-
scored his aversion to political factions and disregard for expediency. For
example, he thought that minimum wage laws abridged freedom of contract
because they allowed government intervention on the behalf of one of the
parties to a private contract under circumstances not recognized under com-
mon law.4 5 As Sutherland noted in Adkins, the District of Columbia mini-
mum wage regulation neither prevented fraud nor protected people who
lacked the capacity to contract -the common law exceptions to the gen-
eral principle of non-interference in private contracts. 7
Indeed, the common law had restricted the freedom of women to enter
into contracts on the presumption that they lacked legal capacity.3 '
Sutherland believed, however, that by the 1920s women had attained relative
political and legal equality with men. Consequently, there was "no longer
any reason why they should be put in different classes in respect of their
legal right to make contracts; nor should they be denied, in effect, the right
345 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 411-12 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (differentiating between women's presumed lack of contrac-
tual capacity at common law and the irrelevance, by the 1920s, of that rule given the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 475-78 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (discussing implied contract condi-
tions at common law); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923).
346 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554. Sutherland also noted that the businesses involved
were not affected with a public interest, nor was there an emergency-both of which
were other common law rationales for public regulation of private rights. See id.
"4 See id. In this sense, Sutherland's ideas were in the mainstream of Lochner era
police powers jurisprudence. Conservative jurists before him primarily defined liberty of
contract from a common law perspective. At common law, neither economic pressure
nor inequality in the bargaining process comprised legal excuses for nonperformance of
employment contracts. Duress was a very narrow exception to this rule, but it was pri-
marily limited to commercial contracts, which the judges differentiated from contracts
of employment. See McCurdy, supra note 26, at 20-21, 24-26 (discussing the work of
Elizabeth Mensch and the reasons why courts often invalidated laws that directly inter-
fered with employment relationships); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(invalidating a law prohibiting yellow-dog (anti-union) contracts on liberty of contract
grounds).
348 See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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to compete with men for work paying lower wages which men may be
willing to accept. '"" Women's suffrage represented a gradual change
within society that made unnecessary the common law's protection of wom-
en in the marketplace. Rather than distinguish the common law, Sutherland
used it to demonstrate that the imposition of a minimum wage was imper-
missible class legislation.
Sutherland also narrowly interpreted the common law in his constitution-
al analysis of public control over private businesses. Since 1877, the Su-
preme Court had sustained public regulation of prices charged by private
businesses who devoted their property to public use. In Munn v. Illinois,35
the Court upheld a law that fixed the price of grain charged by a private
grain elevator. In so holding, the Court adopted a principle of common law
intended to distinguish between private business activities in which the pub-
lic had some peripheral concern and those whose characteristics necessitated
public control."' Though broadly applied in Munn, by the 1920s the Court
narrowly confined the affectation doctrine to three categories. Accordingly, a
business became affected with a public interest and thus subject to price
regulation if it: (1) provided a service to the public pursuant to a public
grant or privilege; (2) was historically regulated because of the services it
"" Id. at 411-12 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland's belief emanated, in large
part, from the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right to
vote.
94 U.S. 113 (1877).
351 See id. at 126 ("Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in
a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large."). Chief
Justice Waite, who wrote the majority opinion in Munn, derived this principle from the
English common law rule set forth in the eighteenth century by Lord Chief Justice
Matthew Hale. As Waite himself explained, "[W]hen private property is 'affected with
a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."' Id. (quoting Matthew Hale, De
Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts 78). Both Thomas Cooley and Stephen Field criti-
cized the Court's broad application of this principle to the private business of grain
elevators, each believing that Hale only meant the affectation doctrine applied to situa-
tions in which the private property had been dedicated specifically to the public use by
its owner, or to situations in which a constructive monopoly or a public grant or privi-
lege was associated with the property. Otherwise, they considered the business wholly
private and its rates immune from state regulation. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 138-41 (Field,
J., dissenting); Jones, supra note 12, at 767 (discussing Cooley's criticism).
Thereafter, the Court somewhat limited its holding in Munn. See Chicago, Milwau-
kee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (ruling that courts can
review the reasonableness of rate regulations). This decision conflicted with Munn's
implicit premise based upon an expansive notion of state police powers, one that mani-
fested judicial deference toward legislative rate determinations. See Maurice Finkelstein,
From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton A Study in the Judicial Process, 27 COLUM.
L. REV. 769, 774-77 (1927). But see German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389
(1914) (sustaining the regulation of insurance industry rates).
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provided to the public (i.e., a mill, inn, common carrier, etc.); or (3) was a
constructive monopoly.352
Sutherland's common law approach underscored his commitment to
economic liberty and inherent distrust of legislative majorities. Insofar as his
factional concerns made him reluctant to defer to legislative declarations of
public interest, they compelled his reliance upon the common law as a con-
stitutional norm. Neither the size of a business nor the widespread use of its
commodities or services transformed it into a public entity that warranted
price regulation.353 While he recognized the authority of government to
prescribe the conduct of private business pursuant to its police powers, he
considered price regulation an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and due
process.
Sutherland's opinion in Tyson and Brother v. Banton354 illustrates his
reliance upon common law doctrine. In Tyson, the Court invalidated a New
York City law that prohibited the resale of tickets to theatrical and other
entertainment events for more than fifty cents over their face value.3" The
law declared resale ticket prices a matter of public interest and said their
regulation was necessary to prevent fraud and exorbitant prices.
356
Sutherland rejected this broad assertion of governmental authority. In an
opinion devoid of economic analysis, Sutherland concluded that the law was
an unconstitutional attempt to fix the prices of a private business.357 Ticket
352 See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923)
(invalidating a Kansas law requiring binding arbitration of wage disputes in the food
processing industry because it was not affected with a public interest).
353 See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (invalidating a
Tennessee law fixing gas prices); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (invalidating
a New Jersey law regulating employment agency fees), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941); Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927) (in-
validating a New York law restricting resale ticket prices).
3- 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
151 See id. at 427. Tyson's company sold resale tickets. Threatened with the revoca-
tion of its business license and criminal sanctions for attempting to resell tickets at
prices in excess of the statutory limit, the company sued, asserting that the law arbitrari-
ly and unreasonably deprived it of liberty and property in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 426-28. The Court earlier had sustained
the licensing provision of the act (New York General Business Law, ch. 590, 1922 N.Y.
Laws § 168). See Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319, 325 (1925).
3516 See Tyson, 273 U.S. at 427. Sutherland explained that a price fixing law does not
necessarily protect consumers from fraud. See id. at 445. The Court also found the New
York law to be overinclusive because it applied to all ticket resellers regardless of their
intent. See id. at 443.
... See id. at 438-42. Sutherland concluded the state could fix only the prices of a
business affected with a public interest. See id. at 430. He also said that legislative
declaration of this matter was subject to judicial review because price fixing was more
intrusive on private rights and liberties than regulations merely pertaining to the conduct
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resellers did not operate pursuant to a public grant or privilege, nor did they
provide the public with an essential service."5 Moreover, Sutherland did
not believe that the business involved a monopoly. 9 Accordingly, he
ruled that the resale of tickets was not a business affected with a public
interest that warranted price regulation.3
In dissent, Justice Stone criticized Sutherland's literal application of the
common law because it ignored the inability of the general public "to pro-
tect themselves" from the imposition of grave wrongs.6 Stone believed
that ticket brokers who purchased advance tickets for prime seats intended
to resell them at much higher prices. Given the control they exerted over the
number of available seats, ticket brokers enjoyed a considerable bargaining
advantage over consumers unable to purchase tickets directly from theatres
and other entertainment venues. From Stone's perspective, the brokers oper-
ated a monopoly which, left unregulated, substantially damaged the public
welfare.362
of private business. See id. at 431.
358 See id. at 439-42.
... See id. at 431-41 (distinguishing Munn v. Illinois).
" See id. at 430-31, 438-41. In essence, Sutherland distinguished between price
fixing and regulating the conduct of a business, asserting the state through its police
powers could do the former only with businesses affected with a public interest. Thus,
while New York could regulate the conduct of a ticket reseller's business even though it
was not, at common law, affected with a public interest, it could not regulate the prices
it charged. See id. at 441-42. Sutherland feared that a contrary ruling would permit all
sorts of governmental price fixing in the entertainment business in the absence of emer-
gency reasons for such regulation and regardless of whether a particular business was
private. See id. at 442. For criticism of Sutherland's distinction between price fixing and
business regulation, see Finkelstein, supra note 351, at 782-83 (questioning the sound-
ness of Sutherland's decision and characterizing it as a judicial usurpation of legislative
discretion). For the concept that public regulation of prices charged by an otherwise
private business is permissible during an emergency, see, for example, Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135 (1921) (sustaining a Washington, D.C. holdover tenancy law as a reason-
able exercise of local police powers during the housing shortage emergency caused by
post-World War I conditions).
31 Tyson, 273 U.S. at 454 (Stone, J., dissenting).
362 See id. at 450-52 (Stone, J., dissenting). Stone believed that Sutherland assessed
the wisdom of the law from the perspective of laissez-faire economics and thus unnec-
essarily constrained the legislature's authority to regulate a business whose "gross
abuse" of an otherwise private right to resell tickets adversely affected the public inter-
est in procuring entertainment tickets at fair prices. Id. at 450 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Stone rejected Sutherland's view of Munn and, instead, focused upon the business's
effects on the public. See id. at 450-51 (Stone, J., dissenting). Stone thought that gov-
ernment intervention in the form of price regulation was appropriate given the gross
inequities in the bargaining positions of ticket resellers and most patrons. Unlike
Sutherland, Stone sought to balance the public interest in obtaining tickets at fair prices
with the private rights of contractual liberty and property. See id. at 452 (Stone, J.,
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Justice Brandeis similarly believed that Sutherland's use of the common
law was inaccurate and inappropriate. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
Brandeis's dissent de-emphasized the common law distinction between pri-
vate businesses and those affected with a public interest?63 Sutherland in-
voked this distinction in his majority opinion when he found unconstitution-
al an Oklahoma law that required entrants into the ice business to show the
necessity of their services to the community.' Sutherland regarded the ice
business as an ordinary one and thus immune from such regulation.365 In
contrast, Brandeis perceived that the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
ice was necessary to preserve food and was a valid public health con-
cern.366 His expansive notion of local police powers recognized the au-
thority of government to regulate a wide spectrum of hitherto private eco-
nomic activities in the paramount interests of the community. 7 Less con-
cerned with factions than Sutherland, Brandeis was reluctant to adhere to
common law principles he regarded as irrelevant. In particular, he noted that
Lord Hale, the English jurist who initially set forth the affectation doctrine,
never intended to apply it beyond the context of government regulation of
wharves and ports.' Rather than operating as a principle of general appli-
cation, the affectation doctrine was initially understood as having no effect
upon the authority of government to otherwise regulate prices.'
That Sutherland and conservative jurists before him may have miscon-
strued the common law in no way diminishes their commitment to using it
in the service of their anti-factional objectives. Furthermore, it does not alter
the perception that Sutherland imbued his constitutional analysis with com-
dissenting).
363 See 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 277, 279 (Sutherland, J.).
31 See id. at 277-79.
31 See id. at 287-89, 291, 300 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
367 See id. at 284-87, 300-11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis was much more
deferential toward the state legislature than was Sutherland, who primarily viewed the
law as impermissible class legislation. Indeed, Brandeis devoted a considerable portion
of his dissent to discussion of both the vital importance of ice to the public and the
longstanding problems in Oklahoma with its reliable distribution to those least likely to
manufacture it themselves. See id. at 287-94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 302 & n.43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
369 See id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the affectation doctrine as applied by
Sutherland "rests upon historical error"). Brandeis, like Stone, rejected a rigid distinc-
tion between private and public businesses for purposes of regulation. He explained:
But so far as concerns the power to regulate, there is no difference in essence,
between a business called private and one called a public utility or said to be
"affected with a public interest." Whatever the nature of the business, whatever
the scope or character of the regulation applied, the source of the power invoked
is the same ... the police power.
Id. at 302 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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mon law principles rather than those of laissez-faire economics, Social Dar-
winism, or natural rights. In fact, on occasion, Sutherland's application of
the common law yielded results one would normally associate with the
utilitarian jurisprudence of the Court's more "progressive" jurists.37
For example, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,37' Sutherland relied upon
the nuisance doctrine to explain the constitutional basis of comprehensive
zoning. He reasoned that if the common law permitted the government to
abate a nuisance in order to prevent one from using his private property to
the detriment of another, then a municipality also should be able to regulate
private land use that harmed the public at large.372 The restriction of indus-
trial development from residential areas pursuant to a law, which by its
general terms operated equally on all citizens, did not represent an illegiti-
mate exercise of police powers. As Sutherland understood the zoning provi-
sion, it promoted public health and safety in response to long-term changes
in demographic and social conditions.373 These, rather than political expe-
diency, were permissible reasons to enact the ordinance.
2. History and Constitutional Limitations
Conservative by nature, Sutherland infused his jurisprudence of econom-
ic liberty with historical perspective. His dissent in Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdel 74 exemplifies his reliance upon the past to interpret the
constitutional limits of governmental authority. In Blaisdell, the Court sus-
tained the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law as a reasonable exercise of
police powers during an economic emergency. 5 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Hughes eschewed a literal interpretation of the Contract Clause
of the United States Constitution for one that balanced the state interest in
general economic welfare with private rights.376 Sutherland, however, used
history to explain that the Contract Clause prohibited all state laws that
370 For the notion that Brandeis and Stone relied upon principles of utilitarian eco-
nomics, see RODELL, supra note 2, at 227; ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 240-41 (1956).
371 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3" See id. at 387-90, 394-95. "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. at 388.
313 See id. at 386-88, 391-95; see also Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S 394 (1915)
(sustaining the regulation of a brickyard on the basis of common law nuisance).
3- 290 U.S. 398, 448-83 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
315 See id. at 445 (Hughes, C.J.).
376 See id. at 439-47. In particular, Hughes noted "a growing appreciation of public
needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between indi-
vidual rights and public welfare." Id. at 442. For Hughes, "the question is no longer
merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable
means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends." Id.
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impaired the obligation of contracts, and especially those "designed to re-
lieve debtors ... in time of financial distress."3
For Sutherland, the foreclosure crisis in Minnesota was no different than
the financial one that precipitated the formation of the Constitution. Noting
the severe economic chaos that ensued from the plethora of debtor relief
laws after the Revolution, he argued that the constitutional Framers intended
to protect contract rights from turbulent democratic majorities and the politi-
cal factions that controlled them.3 78 A mortgage moratorium that impaired
the contract rights of mortgagees, therefore, was precisely the type of class
legislation that the Contract Clause was meant to prohibit. 379
From Sutherland's viewpoint, the majority had ignored the historical
context of the Contract Clause and thus had altered the original purpose of
an important constitutional limitation. Sutherland feared that under Hughes's
interpretation, the Contract Clause would become a meaningless provision
subject to legislative whims and judicial pragmatism. 38 ' This particularly
troubled Sutherland, and he reminded the Court that unless amended, the
meaning of a constitutional provision remains constant.38' Otherwise, the
Constitution would revert into "a mere collection of political maxims to be
adhered to or disregarded according to the prevailing sentiment or the leg-
islative and judicial opinion in respect of the supposed necessities of the
hour. 3
8 2
37 Id. at 453 (quotation), 465 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
371 See id. at 453-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
379 See id. at 449, 453, 465, 471-72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland perceived
no difference between the Depression and previous economic crises that had precipitat-
ed debtor relief laws invalidated by the Court. See id. at 471 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Indeed, he believed three cases in particular were controlling, each of which involved
legislation enacted in response to a financial crisis. See Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S.
118 (1896) (invalidating as an unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations a
Kansas law that retroactively extended a mortgage redemption period to eighteen
months); Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1860) (invalidating as an uncon-
stitutional impairment of contract obligations an Alabama law that permitted a two year
mortgage redemption period); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (invali-
dating as an unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations an Illinois law that
extended a mortgage redemption period for a year). Chief Justice Hughes distinguished
Bronson, noting that in that case the time period was unconditional, whereas in
Blaisdell, the mortgagors had to pay rent during the redemption period. See Blaisdell,
290 U.S. at 432 (Hughes, C. J.).
380 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449-53, 465, 472-73 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
Sutherland commented: "If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they
pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned." Id. at 483
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
381 See id. at 449-50 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856)).
382 Id. at 450 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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Primarily concerned with the stability of constitutional principles,
Sutherland believed that a written constitution permits flexible application of
its provisions consistent with their intended meaning.383 By its terms, how-
ever, the Contract Clause is an absolute limitation upon all state laws that
impair the obligation of contracts, and for this reason Sutherland argued that
the Minnesota law was unconstitutional.8 To permit the excuse of an eco-
nomic emergency to expand the scope of state police powers, as Hughes
did, would subvert the primacy of the Constitution and threaten the long-
term public interest in the sanctity of private contracts.
A sense of history, rather than economic determinism, pervaded
Sutherland's dissent. Like conservative jurists before him, he did not invoke
constitutional limits to preserve a certain economic order. Sutherland's main
objective in Blaisdell, as in other economic liberty cases, was to assess the
legitimacy of police powers and not the wisdom or merits of legislation.3 5
Historical custom and the common law reinforced his commitment to impar-
tial government and enhanced his perception that constitutional limitations
existed to restrain the unbridled self-interest of political factions.
C. Economic Liberty and the Ironies of Sutherland's Jurisprudence
Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty also reflected his concept
of judicial review. Throughout his public career, Sutherland emphasized the
critical role of an independent judiciary in preserving the rights of the mi-
nority from the tyranny of democratic majorities. Constitutional provisions
existed in large part, he thought, to limit government in order to protect
individual rights and liberties from incursion by political factions. Through
impartial interpretation of its text, Sutherland believed judges were more
likely than other public officials to uphold the Constitution and prevent it
from becoming an instrument of oppression and civil instability. 6
... See id. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 473, 480-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting ) (arguing that the statute not
only modified the contractual remedies of the mortgagee, but also destroyed its underly-
ing contract rights when it denied the mortgagee absolute possession of the property for
two years). As a general rule, a state may alter a private contract remedy as long as it
does not impair the corresponding contract rights and duties, which comprise the con-
tractual obligations. Initially, this theoretical distinction between contract rights and
remedies played an integral role in nineteenth century Contract Clause jurisprudence,
but it became less important after the Civil War. See Olken, supra note 307, at 522-36;
see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (sustaining a prospective
insolvency law); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (invalidating
a law that retroactively discharged a debtor from a debt).
35 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 483 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
386 See supra notes 250-66 and accompanying text.
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As a member of the Supreme Court, Sutherland adhered to a conserva-
tive judicial tradition hostile toward political factions. Careful scrutiny of
governmental action was therefore considered an essential prerogative in a
limited democracy. In this regard, he insisted that economic regulation bear
a substantial relationship to public safety, health, morals, or welfare. During
his later years as a Supreme Court Justice, however, the Court adopted a
more deferential approach in economic substantive due process as it explicit-
ly recognized the public interest in private contracts. Sutherland believed
that in balancing public authority and private rights to determine the scope
of state police powers, the Court had allowed political expediency to dimin-
ish its essential function. Dismayed that the Court had begun to sustain the
types of laws it earlier would have invalidated as illegitimate class legisla-
tion, Sutherland implored his colleagues not to abdicate their constitutional
authority. Ultimately, it was for these reasons-not the protection of proper-
ty rights for their own sake-that he dissented in Blaisdell and West Coast
Hotel.
In particular, Sutherland was troubled by the Court's willingness to re-
examine precedent because of changed economic circumstances. 7 In West
Coast Hotel, Sutherland reminded his colleagues that "the meaning of the
Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events."38 Three years earlier, Sutherland had made a similar observation
in Blaisdell when he argued that, notwithstanding the Depression, the Con-
tract Clause prohibited any state law that impaired the obligation of a con-
tract."'
Like his mentor Thomas Cooley, Sutherland believed that a written
constitution provided the stability necessary to preserve individual rights in
a democratic republic. 9 While he understood that the provisions of a con-
stitution were subject to amendment, he considered it inappropriate for judg-
es to alter the meaning of constitutional principles through "the guise of
interpretation."39' Equal operation of the law, therefore, required judges to
pursue impartial analysis and thus refrain from becoming the instruments of
social or economic policy.392 Relatively early in his judicial tenure
38? See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Hughes invoked the notion of changed economic conditions as
a rationale for the Court to re-examine the viability of Adkins v. Children's Hospital
and its narrow restriction upon state police powers in the liberty of contract context. See
id. at 388-90 (Hughes, C.J.). Hughes emphasized "that freedom of contract is a quali-
fied and not an absolute right." Id. at 392 (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)).
388 Id. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 450-51
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
389 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 473 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
'90 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 54.
391 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
31 See Sutherland, The Law and the.People, supra note 177, at 8 (contending that
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Sutherland noted that "[c]onstitutional principles, applied as they are writ-
ten ... operate justly and wisely as a general thing, and they may not be
remolded by lawmakers or judges to save exceptional cases of inconve-
nience, hardship or injustice." '393 Sutherland feared that once judges subor-
dinated the intended meaning of constitutional provisions to the exigent de-
mands of public imperative they would compromise their critical role in the
constitutional system. Years before he joined the Court, Sutherland ex-
pressed this concern when he commented that:
To suggest that the court must construe the Constitution in
accordance with the popular will, or that judicial decisions
should be subject to be overruled by popular opinion ... is
simply to advocate a method by which the rights of the
minority shall be subordinate to the will of those who for the
time being predominate in numbers.3'9
From this perspective, Sutherland objected to the methodology Chief Justice
Hughes employed in a series of cases that transformed the standard of judi-
cial review in economic substantive due process from one of strict scrutiny
to rational basis.395
Sutherland differed from several members of the Hughes court in his
conception of the judicial function. Whereas Hughes, Brandeis, Cardozo,
and Stone openly acknowledged that judicial decision making incorporated
elements of social and economic policy, 396 Sutherland and his fellow dis-
senters rejected this premise. As Sutherland explained in 1913, before he
joined the Court, "in construing law, the judge has nothing to do with con-
sequences, he must enforce the law as he finds it."' 397 Judges declared the
law, they did not make it, and their principal task in a constitutional democ-
racy was to decide questions of power to prevent intemperate action by
democratic majorities. 9
recall of judicial decisions and judges would introduce political and social expediency
into the judicial process and threaten the stability of legal and constitutional principles).
3' Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927).
" Sutherland, What Shall We Do With the Constitution?, supra note 225, at 3.
395 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 411 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (Sutherland, J., join-
ing).
31 See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (applying utilitarian economics); Tyson, 273 U.S. at 447-54
(Stone, J., dissenting) (applying utilitarian economics); see also MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE, supra note 370, at 240-41; RODELL, supra note 2, at. 227 (discussing Brandeis's
attempt to read his own economic views into the Constitution).
"9 Sutherland, The Law and the People, supra note 177, at 8.
398 49 CONG. REC. 2903, 2911 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
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Sutherland's deep regard for the Constitution made him increasingly
anxious about the nature of judicial review in his last years on the Court. He
thought that departure from precedent and pragmatic constitutional interpre-
tation delegitimized the judiciary. His dissenting opinions emanated from a
strong sense of duty and resonated with long held convictions about the
primacy of constitutional limitations."' As early as 1913, Sutherland ex-
pressed concern about manipulating the Constitution to attain short term
objectives. In a speech before the Senate, he warned "that if we violate the
Constitution in order to bring about a good result, or what we fancy to be a
good result, we have opened the door of opportunity for future violations
where the result may be neither good nor wise. ""'
Not surprisingly, Sutherland expressed his disagreement with the Court's
decisions to sustain the Minnesota mortgage moratorium and the Washing-
ton state minimum wage regulation. In a passage often misunderstood by
those who attribute to Sutherland a reactionary judicial activism, he ex-
plained, in part, his reluctance to join the Court's opinion in West Coast
Hotel:
Self-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of judg-
ment. The check upon the judge is that imposed by his oath
of office, by the Constitution and by his own conscientious
and informed convictions; and since he has the duty to make
up his own mind and adjudge accordingly, it is hard to see
how there could be any other restraint.4"'
Sutherland's convictions were not those of an adherent of laissez-faire
economics or of Social Darwinism-motives often attributed to his juris-
prudence. His progressive views about workmen's compensation and toler-
ance of laws regulating the conditions of labor belied any sort of commit-
ment to unrestricted individualism.4"' Moreover, the conservative judicial
tradition he followed cared little about theories of economic efficiency, and
Sutherland consciously avoided them as a basis of ascertaining the scope of
police powers.4 3 To the extent that Sutherland opposed economic regula-
3 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 401-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissent-
ing); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
49 CONG. REc. 2903, 2911 (1913) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
40' West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
402 See Letter to Samuel Gompers, supra note 167, at 1-3; Letter from Samuel
Gompers to 0. E. Asbridge 1-2 (June 30, 1916) (noting Sutherland's extensive support
for many kinds of labor reform laws) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at
the Library of Congress).
3 See supra notes 128-30, 132-34 and accompanying text.
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tion, he did so because, notwithstanding its ameliorative purpose, it created
arbitrary distinctions that advantaged some but not others in ways tenuously
connected to the long-term interests of the entire community.
Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic liberty also was not influenced
significantly by natural rights. Few jurists relied extensively upon natural
rights after the Civil War because their illusory nature and highly abstract
qualities diminished their utility as a basis for ascertaining the precise limits
of government.' Instead, common law and historical custom primarily
shaped the contours of constitutional jurisprudence.' Thomas Cooley,
Sutherland's law teacher at Michigan and probably the jurist who most
influenced him, explicitly rejected the use of natural rights as a constitution-
al norm even though he acknowledged their initial importance in the Ameri-
can historical experience."' Sutherland at times may have invoked the
rhetoric of natural rights, but this does not mean that his was a jurispru-
dence of natural rights. He dissented from the Court's opinions in Blaisdell
and West Coast Hotel because he believed the Court had abandoned its
commitment to the determination of the limits of local economic regulation
on the neutral grounds of factional aversion.
Nevertheless, Sutherland's unfledging commitment to equal operation of
the law exposed serious flaws in his jurisprudence of economic liberty. The
conservative judicial tradition, to which Sutherland faithfully adhered, re-
flected notions of democracy and economic liberty rendered somewhat obso-
lete by the tremendous changes in industrial society after the Civil War. It
assumed that partial laws enacted for the benefit of some groups but not
others signified impermissible class legislation inimical to the long-term
public welfare.4" Jurists like Thomas Cooley extolled the virtues of equal
opportunity and perceived the basis of a thriving democracy to be in con-
tractual freedom and the right to property. Economic liberty, however, did
not exist in a meaningful sense for many people by the end of the nine-
teenth century. By the time Sutherland joined the Court in 1922, there was a
considerable discrepancy between those few who enjoyed significant eco-
nomic power and the vast majority for whom government intervention in the
4 See Nelson, supra note 11, at 548-50; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11; Siegel,
Lochner Era Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 63-65.
4o See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 87, at 22, 59-61; Jones,
supra note 12, at 757-59 (discussing Cooley); Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1492-
1515 (discussing Cooley's constitutional jurisprudence); Siegel, Lochner Era Jurispru-
dence, supra note 1, at 63-65, 78-80 & n. 398, 82-90 (discussing preeminence of
historism and common law).
4"6 See Jones, supra note 12, at 760-63; Siegel, Historism, supra note 11, at 1492-
1515.
41 See generally GILLMAN, supra note 12; Benedict, supra note 12, at 298, 316-20,
323, 328-31.
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industrial economy had become a necessary means of restoring widespread
economic opportunity.
In large part, Sutherland distinguished between law and politics when he
invoked constitutional limits to protect property rights from democratic
majorities. Yet in using judicial review as a means of restraining political
factions that he thought manipulated the democratic process for their own
selfish ends, he neglected to consider that the invalidation of some types of
local economic regulation actually preserved the status quo in ways detri-
mental to the public welfare, given inequities in the bargaining process and
the sad realities of industrial life.4" In particular, Sutherland failed to real-
ize that in some instances judicial aversion to factions perpetuated unequal
economic power and limited the efficacy of the political process to broaden
economic opportunity through legislative reform."1
Sutherland's dissent in Blaisdell exemplifies the limits of his jurispru-
dence. Sutherland construed the Minnesota mortgage moratorium as a partial
law enacted for the benefit of one class of debtors that impaired the private
contract rights of mortgagees.' As Chief Justice Hughes explained, how-
ever: "The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worth while,- a government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society.".4 Sutherland, preoccupied with the ideal
of neutral government, simply did not consider that the literal enforcement
of a mortgage contract actually might exacerbate social and economic unrest
during a recession and thus jeopardize the long-term interests of the commu-
nity.41
2
Moreover, Sutherland's reliance upon historical experience and the com-
mon law as constitutional norms occasionally obscured his understanding of
the context of issues before him on the Court. For example, Sutherland
408 See GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 136-37, 148, 152-53, 176-77, 203; Charles Grove
Haines, Minimum Wage Act for District of Columbia Unconstitutional, 58 AM. U. L.
REV. 581, 592 (1924); Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 120, passim; Thomas
Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 pt. 7, 18 VA. L.
REV. 379, 400 (1932); Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legisla-
tion, 37 HARv. L. REV. 545 (1924).
409 Jennifer Nedelsky discusses this concept in the context of her analysis of private
property and the Constitution's Framers. See NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 1-3, 7, 159,
199, 205-06. Nedelsky says Lochner era court opinions invalidating state laws were
consistent with the "Federalists' vision of constitutionalism." Id. at 228; see also
GILLMAN, supra note 12, at 136-37, 148, 152-53, 176-77, 203 (discussing the inequities
in the bargaining process of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
410 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 472, 480-83 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
411 Id. at 435 (Hughes, C.J.).
412 See Olken, supra note 307, at 597-98.
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incorrectly concluded that mortgage moratoria and minimum wage regula-
tions of the twentieth century were identical in both form and effect to the
debtor relief and currency measures that precipitated this country's economic
crisis after the Revolution. In fact, many Depression era economic regula-
tions were enacted to alleviate harsh conditions that occurred in the absence
of government action and to enhance economic opportunity for most of the
public. Redistribution of resources was not the final objective. In contrast,
much of the post-Revolutionary economic regulation reflected conscious
attempts by political factions of debtors to disadvantage creditors. Financial
chaos ensued precisely because of partial legislation.4"3 Sutherland unfor-
tunately overlooked this subtle difference and thus misunderstood both the
intent and the effect of some laws.
The irony of Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence was its myo-
pia. Its focus on political factions and emphasis upon equal operation of the
law sometimes blinded Sutherland to the economic realities of twentieth
century industrial society. This, in turn, contributed to the notion that
Sutherland's was essentially a jurisprudence of laissez-faire economics or
Social Darwinism.414 Sutherland, however, invoked freedom of contract
not to protect the interests of an economic elite, but, rather, as a constitu-
tional paradigm for liberty of all kinds in a democratic republic.415 He con-
sciously avoided reading a particular socio-economic order into the Consti-
tution and remained critical of judges who assessed the wisdom of the law
on this basis. Unable to detect the inherent limits of his economic liberty
jurisprudence, Sutherland clung to its fundamental tenets in the face of in-
tense criticism and thus unwittingly fostered misconceptions about his judi-
cial motivations that persist today. Ironically, it was the consistency of his
factional aversion that underscored both his greatest strengths and most
significant weaknesses as a jurist.
CONCLUSION
Few Supreme Court Justices have been so misunderstood as George
Sutherland, whose reputation in the area of economic liberty has suffered
because of the persistent, but incorrect, notion that his was a jurisprudence
that used principles of laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism to pro-
413 See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE -SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 45-
46 (1969); NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 228 (differentiating early twentieth century
industrial and economic reform laws from late eighteenth century redistributive laws).
414 See, e.g., Haines, supra note 408, at 592; PASCHAL, SUTHERLAND: A MAN
AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 10, passim; Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage
Legislation, supra note 154, at 555-56, 560, 572-73.
415 Jennifer Nedelsky discusses this concept in her analysis of property and the
Constitution's Framers. See NEDELSKY, supra note 15, at 1, 6, 23-25, 32, 38, 153, 204,
206-08; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
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mote the interests of an economic elite. In large part, misconceptions about
Sutherland derive from the perceptions that popular mythology has assigned
to the conservative judicial tradition to which he belonged and whose funda-
mental tenets he invoked unsuccessfully as the Court transformed economic
substantive due process in the 1930s. Indeed, recent historiography about
late nineteenth and early twentieth century police powers jurisprudence
suggests that, for Lochner era judges, the appropriate limits of local eco-
nomic regulation emanated from longstanding concerns about the vulnerabil-
ity of individual rights in a democratic republic. Aversion to political fac-
tions and a passionate commitment to equal operation of the law informed
judicial decision making. Jurists interpreted constitutional restrictions upon
governmental authority through historical custom and the common law,
rather than socio-economic theory or abstract notions of natural law, and
sought to prevent the tyranny of democratic majorities controlled by the
self-interest of political factions.
From this altered perspective, Sutherland's jurisprudence of economic
liberty assumes an altogether different meaning. In addition, a strong consis-
tency emerges between Sutherland's relatively progressive views about
workplace conditions and women's suffrage before he came onto the Court
and the distinctions he drew between various kinds of economic regulation
as a Supreme Court Justice. For these reasons, the common pejorative views
of Sutherland oversimplify his motives and ignore the precise historical
context of his thought. Throughout his public career, Sutherland believed
that the self-interest of political factions threatened the long-term public
welfare. To this extent, he regarded economic regulation that benefited one
group at the expense of another as illegitimate class legislation. He did not,
however, oppose neutral government action that advanced the interests of
the entire community. Both before and after he got onto the Court,
Sutherland supported regulations of conditions of labor, workmen's compen-
sation measures, and women's suffrage. Conversely, Sutherland thought that
laws that prescribed prices and wages or restricted entry into business were
arbitrary and unreasonable.
Sutherland adhered to the rigid categories of Lochner era police powers
jurisprudence because he mistakenly construed industrial conditions of the
early twentieth century as no different from those of the past. His inherent
conservatism made him skeptical of abrupt change pursuant to the claim of
public imperative. Sutherland's error was his inability to perceive how the
anti-factional tradition upon which he relied embodied insular assumptions
about law and democracy rendered largely untenable by the Depression.
Convinced that an independent judiciary must use impartial means to inter-
pret constitutional limits of government, Sutherland never understood that
the antidemocratic nature of judicial review at times reinforced unequal
economic power. Therein lies the ultimate irony of Justice George
Sutherland's jurisprudence.
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